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Chairman’s summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
fter having noted the ambitious, broad-spectrum, and deliberate 
nature of Barack Obama’s foreign policy, the Chairman put to the 
speakers the general question of the American president’s chances 
of success. In this respect, we were fortunate to have an excellent panel, 
with Professor David CALLEO (John Hopkins University, Washington), 
Camille GRAND (Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 
in Paris), Professor SHEN Dingli (Fudan University, Shanghai) and Ivan 
SAFRANCHUK (State Institute for International Relations in Moscow).  
David Calleo considered that Obama’s success was problematic in the 
plural world which now exists: there will be no restoration of America’s 
pre-Iraq-war position despite the restoration of grace, generosity and 
modesty. As in his paper, he considered that the EU was a model of 
organization of regional power, with the Euro playing an increasingly 
important role, whereas slower US growth would constrain Washington’s 
strategic choices.  
Camille Grand noted that Obama’s focus on morality (the issue of 
torture, Guantanamo etc.) went beyond PR: it gave the new administration 
a major comparative advantage in coping with three substantial challenges 
discussed in his paper: walking the tightrope of issues concerning the 
Muslim world (with Netanyahu’s policies as a first test); reinventing 
multilateralism (with CTBT ratification and post-Kyoto as the tests) and the 
need to operationalise the new nuclear order. When asked by the Chairman 
why there had been no honeymoon with Europe, he noted that there had 
been no clear point of application for a honeymoon: not the economic crisis, 
not the issue of Turkey’s membership of the EU, not strategy vis-à-vis 
“AFPAK”. 
Shen Dingli considered that it was too early to comment on Obama’s 
chances of success. However, he was pessimistic not only about the 
possibility of pulling North Korea back from its nuclear programme or of 
                                                     
* François Heisbourg is a Senior Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche 
Stratégique in Paris and Chairman of the European Security Forum. 
A
OBAMA’S FOREIGN POLICY: IS THIS CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN? | 3 
stopping Iran from enriching uranium but also about prospects for 
withdrawal from Iraq, let alone Afghanistan, or about the possibility of 
pacifying Pakistan. In terms of US-China relations, he expressed the hope 
that Obama would pick up from the Bush jr. legacy: 
In this regard, there was positive language on the financial front, with 
the US Treasury no longer accusing China of manipulating the exchange 
rate of the RMB. Conversely, in view of recent naval incidents, the US had 
not acknowledged China’s regional efforts for peaceful resolution of issues 
concerning the South China Sea. To a question from the Chairman about 
the prospects of “Chimerica”, Professor Shen took the view that there is no 
“G-2”, that the US is n°1. The US and China should certainly work together 
on post-Kyoto in Copenhagen: but China is “bearing the burden” of carbon 
emissions produced on its territory in order to satisfy foreign demand for 
Chinese exports (in subsequent debate, the retort was made that such a line 
of reasoning could serve to justify protectionist measures against Chinese 
exports on environmental grounds). 
For Ivan Safranchuk, Obama was locked in a ‘bound to lead’ mode, 
arriving with pre-cooked solutions without having brought in the regional 
players; he noted the weight of the BRICs and China’s greater 
assertiveness. As in his paper, he underscored the fact that contemporary 
security risks tend to be local or regional in terms of their origin and 
dynamic rather than global. He did not share Professor Shen’s admiration 
of the Bush jr. administration. On the financial front, he took the view that 
the value of the $ was entirely dependent on US fiscal policy: this never 
ceased to pose a problem for energy-exporting countries. 
As a result the presentations of the paper-givers, the Chairman laid 
out several items for further consideration: 
- the notion of a ‘plural world’ 
- the absence of a honeymoon: it still takes two to tango 
- the pessimism of all four concerning Obama’s chances of success ( 
success according to the US  administration’s own terms)  
- the particular difficulty of integrating the management of short-terms 
crisis (including the recession) and long-term challenges (climate-
change) 
- the role of the BRICs, individually or collectively 
In the debate from the floor, an American analyst made three 
observations: 
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- according to Mark Leonard, only some 10% of the projected $1.2 
trillion US budget deficit is attributable to decisions made since 
Obama’s inauguration (37% flow from the mechanical effect of the 
recession and 53% from Bush-era policies); 
- in his Cairo speech, Obama acknowledged that the US can no longer 
attempt to impose its narrative (e.g. the absence of the word 
‘terrorism’) 
- on moral issues, and notably on the use of torture, American society 
remains divided. 
An EU representative noted that it wasn’t popular to openly criticize 
Obama: in politics, that counts. He also asserted that Obama was pragmatic 
rather than visionary. 
A US official expanded on this, stating that when you want to sell an 
idea, you wrap it around a person. Conversely, he took exception to the 
notion that the new administration was going in with fixed ideas. 
A Commission official underlined in turn, that nothing negative had 
been said at this meeting about Obama’s intentions: that, in itself is a 
novelty. He wondered whether doubt wouldn’t come first from the 
domestic constituency (note: at the time of the meeting, the health care 
debate had not yet picked up). 
With a return to the panel, I. Safranchuk maintained that there was a 
good deal of “fixed ideas” involved, notably at the level of the special 
envoys: Richard Holbrooke is not in the fact-finding business…Because 
regional players, including Russia, are feeling the corresponding pressure, 
they are looking around for a broader set of choices. 
Shen Dingli for his part insisted on the visionary side of Obama: the 
Christian and American legacy of the shining city on the hill, US 
exceptionalism in a global setting, indeed anti-communism, as 
demonstrated in the sentence which was cut from China’s airing of 
Obama’s inaugural address. 
In image terms, the new President is successful. But international 
cooperation can make the difference between success and failure of policy. 
He asserted that a US statement declaring that the Iraq war was illegal 
along with readiness to compensate the victims would be helpful. 
Camille Grand restated that it takes two to tango, noting that some of 
America’s best friends under Bush jr., such as Israel and India, had 
problems with Obama’s vision, while some of America’s opponents –North 
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Korea, Venezuela-are not necessarily changing their policies. Relations with 
Iran are in a state of suspense. Strategies still need to be defined. 
Nonetheless, Obama had demonstrated that he wasn’t a rookie in 
international affairs, and he had not been afraid to assemble a brilliant 
foreign policy team. 
David Calleo, on a similar note, considered that Obama is probably 
the best diplomat the US has produced in a long time, with exceptional 
instincts and good thinking about the world. 
To a parting question from Michael Emerson concerning the nature of 
US policy in a potentially semi-anarchic pluralist world, the panellists were 
invited to respond in a nutshell: 
- We don’t know what Obama’s take on multilateralism is (C. Grand) 
- The US doesn’t quarrel with China any more about the RMB (Shen) 
- we live in an age of regionalism (I. Safranchuk) 
- balances of power work between friendly powers, along the lines of 
domestic balances of power in a democracy (D. Calleo). 
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An American Perspective 
David Calleo* 
or several months following the election of November, 2008, most 
Americans took great pleasure in their charismatic new president. A 
series of soaring speeches, frank interviews and pragmatic initiatives 
made real changes for the better seem possible. Of course, other presidents 
have begun with high hopes, only to be ensnared in multiple dilemmas 
inherited from their predecessors. By the summer of 2009, Obama’s own 
prospects begin to seem more problematic. Disagreements have surfaced 
between the Presidency and the Congress and rumours proliferate about 
splits within the administration’s own ranks. Fear grows that the president 
– attempting simultaneously to overcome a severe financial crisis, address 
long-neglected needs of the domestic economy and win two intractable 
wars – has overreached himself.  
Assessing the long-term prospects for Obama’s foreign policy 
requires determining what its particular elements and priorities actually 
are. To what extent is there a coherent vision as opposed to a series of ad 
hoc responses to inherited situations? So far, the administration’s 
overriding concern has been the world economic crisis. Foreign policy in 
general has been dominated by economic policy in particular. Our most 
significant diplomacy has been concerned with persuading other major 
countries to adopt financial remedies compatible with our own. 
But today’s economic diplomacy also raises broader geopolitical 
issues about the future character of world order. As the financial and 
economic crisis unfolds, geopolitical concerns increasingly dominate the 
economic policies of the world’s major powers. The US can hardly ignore 
the impact of today’s financial and economic crisis on America’s 
international role. So far, the crisis probably favours a ‘declinist’ view of 
American global hegemony. In marked contrast to the American 
geopolitical vision of a decade or two ago, today’s dispensation of power is 
increasingly seen as plural rather than unipolar. Such a view suggests a 
                                                     
* Professor, John Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. 
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fresh dispensation of respective roles for the US, the European states, 
Russia and China. To what extent is the Obama administration influenced 
by this pluralist view? Has it generated what might be called a 
corresponding geopolitical vision of America’s place in the world? Is the 
administration actually guided by such a vision? How inclined is the rest of 
the world to accept it? Can Americans themselves believe in it? Finally, to 
what extent are these broad questions being determined by the interaction 
of differing financial policies among the major players? In short, what is the 
likely impact of today’s financial and economic crisis on America’s 
traditional leading international role? To what extent does Obama’s foreign 
policy anticipate that impact? 
Political-economic linkages are never simple and no doubt it is too 
early to tell how present policies will unfold. But one linkage that seems 
relatively direct and decisive is the future place of the dollar in 
international monetary arrangements. For more than a half century, the 
dollar’s role as the world’s principal reserve currency has given the US an 
unmatched capacity to create credit for itself; money that the rest of the 
world has been willing to accept. That capacity has been a critical element 
in America’s leading global position. It has, however, been contested 
periodically and now appears seriously threatened. 
Elaborating the current threat calls for a closer look at Obama’s own 
financial policies. These come in three broad categories: the first is the 
continuation and elaboration of the Bush administration’s response to the 
financial crisis. It involves creating several trillion dollars in actual or 
potential credit to compensate the banking and insurance industries for the 
collapse of their ‘toxic’ assets. This financial ‘rescue package’ is now being 
extended to America’s stricken automobile industry. Although the 
government is trying to avoid formal nationalisations, inevitably it is taking 
a more and more dominant regulatory role in the afflicted industries. 
Obama’s second category of financial policies reflects the social priorities 
encapsulated in his proposed fiscal budget. It anticipates, for example, a 
major overhaul of the scandalously inadequate but costly healthcare 
system. It also provides for augmented spending on the country’s long-
neglected infrastructure, along with subsidies for research, education and 
new technologies. The third broad category has to do with the costs of 
America’s geopolitical exposure in general and the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq in particular. Obama hopes to withdraw from Iraq without defeat 
and emerge triumphant from Afghanistan. An unprecedented fiscal deficit 
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– well over a trillion dollars for next year alone – is the obvious result of 
these combined Obama policies.  
Given the country’s current fear of deflation and general aversion to 
taxes, financing these outlays implies a massive monetary expansion. The 
balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, a good indicator of monetary 
stimulus, has already expanded from $900 billion in September 2008 to 
over $2.1 trillion as of May 2009. The neo-Keynesian view of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s provides a popular apology for today’s expansive 
policies. Recovery in the 1930s was delayed, according to that view, 
because President Roosevelt failed to keep running adequate fiscal deficits. 
Not until World War II, it is said, was government spending sufficient to 
shock the economy out of its paralysis. Historians of our era are unlikely to 
fault the Bush and Obama administrations for comparative timidity.  
Obama’s policies point towards a different complaint. Creating 
money on such a scale naturally feeds fears of enormous inflation to follow. 
It brings into question the credit-worthiness of the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve themselves. A sharp rise in long-term interest rates for 
government bonds would be a normal reaction; it now appears to be 
underway. Servicing debts will thus threaten to take an ever-larger share of 
future budgets, particularly as demographic trends point towards still 
heavier pension and medical costs. The temptation for future governments 
to inflate away their debt will, some fear, prove irresistible.  
To be sure, others discount this fear. Much of the new credit is being 
used to replace assets that have abruptly lost their value. If such assets 
begin to recover, nothing prevents the government from compensating by 
withdrawing its new credit from the banking system. Faith in such 
monetary ‘fine tuning’ is, however, no longer as fashionable as it once was. 
Experience suggests that future governments may find it difficult to impose 
the short-term sacrifices that avoiding inflation would seem to require. 
Most post-war American administrations, at least after Eisenhower’s 
presidency, have tended to favour growth over stability, with a bias 
towards monetary ease that encourages periodic bubbles and crashes. 
Wage and price inflation in the US have, however, been relatively 
restrained since the 1980’s. In the 1990s, it was popular to attribute the 
apparently low inflation to remarkable productivity gains, or to trade 
liberalisation. Arguably, opening the American market to low-cost 
competitors, like Mexico or China, made it difficult for American producers 
to raise prices or wages. But as traditional wage and price inflation waned 
it was replaced by ‘asset inflation’. Hence the bloated values for shares and 
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real estate that prepared the current banking crisis. The collapse of these 
inflated assets now makes us fear deflation – a depression. But behind 
today’s deflation lies the long-standing inflation that prepared the way for 
it. Fear of a return to inflation rests on the unprecedented creation of 
money, which is going on as we speak. 
What does all this have to do with foreign policy? The fate of the 
dollar is inextricably linked to the issue of inflation. Obama’s explosion of 
credit is not starting from scratch. Foreigners already hold a huge overhang 
of dollars. Given our still large current-account deficit, the dollar’s 
exchange rate depends on the willingness of foreigners not only to hang on 
to the dollars they already possess, but to continue accumulating very large 
new holdings. Since World War II we have grown accustomed to having 
foreigners accept our dollars. The principal holders were, of course, 
countries we were protecting from the Soviet Union. Germany and Japan, 
in particular, were our military protectorates. For them, holding our dollars 
could be seen as a form of geopolitical burden-sharing – a reasonable 
bargain, awkward to refuse. With the demise of the Soviet Union, however, 
the dollar’s compelling geopolitical support is largely gone. Moreover, 
throughout the Cold War there was really no other international currency 
to replace the dollar. With the euro, there now is an alternative currency. 
Without the Soviets and with the euro our dollar is in a different world. 
No doubt it will take time for new realities to work themselves out. 
Increasingly prominent among today’s dollar holders are the Japanese and 
Chinese. While the rich Japanese may still be content to invest heavily in 
the sinking dollar – to preserve their exports and their alliance – it is 
difficult to imagine the Chinese continuing indefinitely in the same posture. 
Indeed, the Chinese seem already engaged in a massive shift of priority to 
their own domestic development – an obviously rational reorientation, 
even if it cannot be accomplished without confronting numerous 
difficulties. At the same time the Chinese have been making trade deals 
with Brazil and Argentina that ostentatiously avoid using the dollar. 
However, given that China’s renminbi is not fully convertible, its imminent 
use as a major reserve currency seems improbable. But the same is not true 
for the euro, which is already the currency for roughly 25% of the world’s 
reserves and the vehicle currency for what is the world’s largest trading 
bloc. 
There is little evidence, however, that the European Central Bank is 
eager to supplant the dollar. The ECB is, none the less, traditionally more 
averse to inflation than the Federal Reserve. While it has not hesitated to 
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pour immense credits into the European banking system during the recent 
crisis, its monetary policy has been relatively restrained over the years. As a 
result, the euro has appreciated significantly over the past decade and 
many European exporters complain of an ‘overvalued’ euro in relation to 
the dollar. This seems particularly serious for those firms that still export 
heavily to the US, or compete heavily with American firms elsewhere. 
Subsidies and protection, of one sort or another, seem likely European 
reactions. A weak and unstable dollar should encourage the EU to reach 
long-term deals with Russia and neighbours generally. It should also 
encourage the Chinese in their already extensive campaign to build a 
regional Asian bloc. In short, a weak and unstable dollar probably points 
towards a world economy where economic relations are more politically 
determined, along regional lines. Such trends may significantly constrain 
America’s pretensions to global hegemony. The prospects for interstate 
conflict are ample in such a climate. It will be important to have 
international institutions that encourage reasonable bargaining and 
emphasise the search for shared interests. Perhaps Europe’s Common 
Market will prove the most appropriate model for organising regional 
systems and their global relations.  
Reflecting on the current situation suggests, I believe, a number of 
possible conclusions about the future of American foreign policy. The first 
is that the Obama presidency is likely to disappoint those who hoped to see 
a restoration of America’s traditional post-war position. Obama is reviving 
the modesty, grace, and generosity that has characterised American 
diplomacy at its best. But he is unlikely to restore the substance of 
American hegemony. Indeed, the notion of an American ‘restoration’ or 
‘recovery’ is itself dubious in present circumstances. The United States will 
probably not ‘recover’ its previous prosperity and position. America’s 
outsized consumption may well decline, no longer subsidised by the rest of 
the world’s support for the dollar. In retrospect the current economic crisis 
may come to be seen as a decisive mutation in the post-war system – 
signalling the unsustainability of unipolar policies and the consequent 
breakup of American hegemony in the capitalist world; a development that 
in certain respects parallels the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by 
the disintegration of its own version of a ‘global’ system. As a result, 
America will be a somewhat poorer country, but should also grow more 
competitive. If the economic crisis spells the end of unlimited credit, an 
overdue geopolitical retrenchment should follow. With luck, the Obama 
administration’s policies will strengthen the country internally, after 
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several decades of neglect. Perhaps we will succeed in avoiding the ruin 
that often afflicts would-be hegemonic powers forced into retreat. We may 
not have to share the recent fate of the Russians. Shorn of outsized 
pretensions, the US may expect to remain the world’s leading power for the 
foreseeable future. In short, Obama might manage a retreat from the 
hyperactive, unipolar foreign policy of the Bush administration into a new 
American role more appropriate to the plural world order that is forming. 
This could be the moment for reducing post-war America’s outsized claims 
on the rest of the world, while trying to coax the world’s other great 
powers into a cooperative new governing structure. A stronger America 
should be able to appease as well as confront. Should we believe this can 
happen? 
It is possible to see signs that Obama is moving in this direction. His 
early approaches towards China, Russia, the Muslim world, and indeed 
Europe, have been sensitive and conciliatory. He has done much to restore 
the image of a more confident, reasonable and modest America – a country 
characterised more by generous partnership than manipulative leadership. 
Such moments of radical geopolitical change are, however, seldom easy to 
navigate. For a beleaguered government, war can present itself as an easier 
solution than accommodation. The administration is already fighting two 
wars. The President has gone out of his way to commit himself to success in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan – unpromising projects. No one should expect 
him to be rescued by a quick return to economic prosperity. 
Perhaps the wisest observation to derive from the present situation is 
that the United States no longer has the means to always take the lead in 
managing the world’s problems. Obama will need to persuade his own 
government to reduce its pretensions accordingly. Perhaps his greatest 
challenge will be to convince the world’s other great powers to rise to their 
own responsibilities. If he fails on either count, the beginning of the 21st 
century may come more and more to resemble the beginning of the 20th. 
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A European Perspective 
Camille Grand* 
he election of Barack Obama has generated hopes that go beyond the 
traditional expectations of a new US administration. 
Going further than a fairly routine party change from Republicans to 
Democrats, the election of Barack Obama was a unique combination of a 
generational and a radical style change. For the first time, not only an 
African-American but an individual with significant non-European foreign 
roots was to lead the world’s largest power. After eight years of a Bush 
administration that had engendered unprecedented distrust vis-à-vis US 
policy and leadership, the new president appeared to be a clean break with 
the past. This is all the more true since the new president does benefit, at 
least until the mid-term elections, from a clear democratic majority in 
Congress, which should facilitate his intended shifts in the US foreign 
policy agenda. 
This election not only symbolised a new era but demonstrated the 
vitality of the US democracy, when many commentators were announcing 
the end of American leadership in the context of the financial crisis. Even 
though the Obama campaign was launched on a foreign and security 
policy issue (namely the withdrawal from Iraq), it is important to underline 
that it was won on the issue of the financial crisis, the depth of which 
Obama understood earlier than his Republican opponent. 
Before going into the foreign policy challenges the new 
administration faces, it is important to remember that the economic crisis is 
likely to be the benchmark for the American electorate in the next elections, 
and that, short of a major national security event of the magnitude of 9/11, 
foreign issues will play a minor role from a domestic perspective in the run 
up to the mid-term elections and the next presidential election. 
As far as the foreign and security policy agenda is concerned, Obama 
is facing a series of major more or less interconnected international 
challenges that will put his vision of international affairs to the test in the 
                                                     
* Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris. 
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coming months. His ability to meet these challenges will determine if the 
proposed substantial changes will be implemented successfully. As he 
distanced himself significantly from the Bush era, each of his strategic 
choices appears as a test of his foreign policy. 
Restoring US Leadership 
Beyond public relations: the issue of moral leadership 
If the rest of the world had voted for the US election, Barack Obama would 
have been elected easily. Extremely popular throughout the world from the 
onset, this was in stark contrast to the hostility that G.W. Bush faced 
abroad. The enthusiasm following Obama’s election was global. 
From that perspective, President Obama benefits from a clear 
advantage in restoring the tarnished image of the US. He took immediate 
decisions that embodied a foreign policy shift from the Bush era, the most 
symbolic being the announcement of the closure of the Guantanamo. 
Announced within the first few days of the presidency, this decision 
was not only a campaign commitment but was also meant to symbolise a 
clear break with the Bush era. The use of the term ‘torture’ to characterise 
certain interrogation techniques authorised by the Bush administration was 
another major shift and certainly a difficult political choice that raised 
hackles in the intelligence community. 
These decisions go much further than mere ‘PR’ exercises but 
demonstrate President Obama’s desire to regain the moral high ground as a 
central figure of US leadership. This moral leadership has been an 
important feature of US foreign policy for more than two centuries; clearly 
the cynicism, lies and mistakes of the Bush administration severely 
undermined that considerable comparative advantage. 
Engaging the Muslim world 
The Cairo speech of June 2008 intended to create a “new beginning 
between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on 
mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that 
America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition”. It 
appears as a defining moment in Obama’s effort to reengage the Muslim 
world; it both pays tribute to the Islamic heritage and is respectful of Islam, 
distancing the US from Israeli positions such as those on the 
implementation of new settlements. 
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This unprecedented move intends to recreate the conditions that 
would allow the US to push the peace process forward by reengaging the 
moderate Muslim countries and sending out the right signals to the 
Muslims themselves.  
For years the Bush administration appeared to align itself with Israeli 
positions; Obama’s choice is an ambitious but risky strategy. He is walking 
a tightrope without the assurance that he will be able to move Israel and 
Arab countries significantly closer to a compromise. The current hard-line 
government in Jerusalem is not facilitating the implementation of this 
strategy and he may already have reached the limits of his ability to exert 
pressure on Israel. 
First Challenge: Containing the terrorist risk while shifting 
strategic priorities 
The absence of any significant attack on US soil since 9/11 is claimed as a 
major success by the Bush administration. As former vice-president Cheney 
immediately underlined in his counterattacks following the closure of 
Guantanamo, the peril of the Obama moral stance is associated with the 
risk of failure in the fight against terrorism. Any major event thus runs the 
risk of weakening the strength of the logic behind the change in 
counterterrorist policies. The strong reluctance that appeared amongst 
congressmen and local communities when the issue of the transfer of 
Guantanamo prisoners to US soil was a first indication of these dilemmas. 
The end of the global war on terror 
While the Bush administration put the Global War on Terror (GWOT) at 
the heart of its international stance, Obama no longer uses this concept and 
insists on not grouping a variety of different issues and regions (radical 
Islamic terrorist, Afghanistan/Pakistan, India/Pakistan, Iraq, 
Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia, South-East Asia…). The end of the 
GWOT is primarily the recognition that Iraq, Afghanistan etc. are different 
issues and that there is no such thing as a ‘global’ war on terror. This shift 
also coincides with the transformation of al-Qaeda into a loose network; 
more of a ‘trademark’ than a structured organisation. 
From Iraq to Afghanistan/Pakistan 
The main consequence of the end of the GWOT is the strategic shift from 
Iraq to Afghanistan.  
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Placing emphasis on Afghanistan was the first strategic decision to be 
made by President Obama, and it goes beyond a clear military priority and 
additional troops. This choice is also the wise recognition that the frontline 
in the war on terror is in fact in Afghanistan and Pakistan; it is therefore a 
major shift from the Bush administration’s six year prioritisation of Iraq. 
As the security situation has worsened significantly in Afghanistan, it 
is a hard choice however, as no clear victory over the Taliban is in sight. 
Moreover the fighting in Pakistan shows that the Taliban movement 
remains strong in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
One of the difficulties Obama is already facing is the lack of strong 
support from his NATO allies, which have not committed more troops or 
money to Afghanistan, in spite of strong American calls in the run-up to 
the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO summit. The lack of clear support in 
Afghanistan for President Karzai is a second major issue putting Obama’s 
Afghan strategy at risk. 
Second Challenge: Reinventing multilateralism 
Reinventing a cooperative and multilateral diplomacy for the US 
On key feature of the Bush era was unilateralism. On this point again, 
Obama’s foreign policy intends to establish a clear break with the past. In 
the United Nations, in the G8 or G20, in NATO, in the Organization of 
American States, the signal is clear, the United States intends to reengage 
the multilateral framework and use these tools not only – once again – as 
an image change but also as part of a broader vision of foreign policy that 
starts from the simple premise that the United States needs the rest of the 
world to address the new economic and strategic challenges ahead, from 
the economic crisis to climate change, proliferation or terrorism. 
This policy does not mean, however, that Obama’s US has renounced 
its leadership; it simply intends to exercise it through new cooperative 
means. It implies a policy of engagement, including with hostile countries 
(Venezuela, Iran…) in an effort to gain diplomatic support for US policies 
and proposals. In that sense, it is a more modest foreign policy. 
The issue will be whether this multilateral approach passes both the 
domestic test (will Congress support the Kyoto Protocol or the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?) and the international test (will the US be 
able to lead by example and gather support to achieve its foreign policy 
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objectives?). A failure to pass these tests might generate a unilateralist 
backlash. 
Revive the transatlantic partnership 
The London G20 meeting, the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO summit and the 
Prague EU/US meeting in March were the first international events of the 
Obama presidency. They offered the president an opportunity to frame his 
views about a renewed transatlantic partnership. He strongly recommitted 
the United States to this partnership. 
Following the trends of the last months of the Bush administration 
but taking them further, the new president decided to push forward a 
vision for a renewed transatlantic partnership built upon a closer and more 
formal EU-US relationship and a reformed NATO for the 21st century. 
Coming from a president with no European background, this appeared to 
be a recommitment to European affairs. 
Obama enjoys unprecedented support amongst Europeans. He 
nevertheless needs to ‘operationalise’ these views, both within the EU/US 
framework and within NATO with the upcoming debate on the Alliance’s 
strategic concept. This process will be crucial as the Alliance has been 
facing a solidarity crisis since the Georgian crisis of August 2008. 
Third Challenge: Rethinking the Global Nuclear Order 
A Vision for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the 21st century 
In his Prague speech, President Obama stated his objective of a “world free 
of nuclear weapons”. This was more the expression of a vision than a 
strategy per se.  
Reading the Prague speech, (before the release of the more detailed 
Nuclear Posture Review next winter), Obama’s nuclear policy can be 
described as following three different paths with very different calendars: 
- He expresses the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and sees 
the long-term objective of nuclear abolition as a moral objective; 
- the President qualifies that objective in the same speech, however, by 
stating that it will not happen in his lifetime. He therefore agrees to 
work on interim and short-term objectives aimed at reducing nuclear 
threats; 
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- He also insists that it is his duty to preserve a safe, secure and reliable 
US nuclear arsenal, signalling that it is not his intention to undermine 
the credibility of the US nuclear position. 
In practical terms, the implications for nuclear diplomacy are 
significant. 
When the Bush administration was heavily criticised for having put 
an end to multilateral, legally binding, and verified nuclear arms control, 
the new administration appears ready to make the case for the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in Congress, to launch the Fissile 
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiation in Geneva and to resume 
discussions with Russia on a follow-up to START that could have both 
verification provision and lead to significant cuts reducing the operational 
stockpile to less than 1500 warheads. An effort has also been announced to 
reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism. 
Once again, this rather ambitious agenda is likely to face significant 
difficulties both domestically and internationally.  
Given the loss of arms control expertise and interest in Congress, will 
the President be willing and able to spend political credit to get several 
treaties ratified in the next couple of years? What is the nature of the 
bargain with the nuclear labs on the CTBT, and how does this process 
interact with decisions about the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) 
debate? Will the US be able to demonstrate leadership in the FMCT 
negotiation in Geneva? 
Internationally, will Russia agree to engage in a process leading 
towards deeper cuts without an agreement on missile defence and NATO 
expansion? Will China, France and the United Kingdom agree to take their 
share of the Obama vision? Can China in particular agree to halt the 
upgrade of its nuclear forces and display more transparency, to allow deep 
US and Russian cuts when many analysts assume that the Chinese nuclear 
arsenal is not only in the modernisation process but also expanding? Will 
the US promise to work towards a nuclear weapon free world suffice to 
restore consensus in the non-proliferation regime as the 2010 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference approaches? Will bilateral 
disarmament and a fissile material cut-off be viewed as enough by 
advocates of nuclear elimination? How will the disarmament agenda 
connect with other issues such as missile defence? Will US allies in East 
Asia, the Gulf and Europe easily allow a process sometimes perceived as 
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weakening the US extended deterrence at a time proliferation when 
concerns are rising? 
All these open questions test the ability of President Obama to fulfil 
the vision enshrined in his Prague speech and thus engender a high level of 
uncertainty. 
Addressing the Iranian and North-Korean non-proliferation crisis 
The most dramatic and immediate challenge to the security order Obama 
intends to build comes from two emerging nuclear countries: Iran and the 
DPRK. 
North Korea welcomed President Obama with a long-range ballistic 
missile/space launcher test in April, followed by a nuclear test in May. The 
six-party talks seem to be in stalemate and any decision by the Obama 
administration to engage the DPRK will be perceived as a sign of weakness. 
No clear alternative is available, however. 
Iran itself is actively pursuing its nuclear programme and has so far 
not given any sign of openness in response to the gestures made by the 
new US administration. US engagement is crucial to resolving the Iranian 
nuclear conundrum and the lack of unequivocal US commitment to a 
compromise was instrumental in the failure of the ‘EU 3 + 3’ process. This 
is nevertheless a trap for the new administration as the Iranians have so far 
shown no willingness to compromise and stop enrichment activities. Iran 
would appear to be an interesting test case for Obama’s foreign policy. Will 
the policy of engaging everyone and in particular those countries hostile to 
the US be more successful than the confrontational approach preferred by 
the previous administration? Is a successful outcome achievable within the 
short time available before the roll back of the Iranian programme becomes 
impossible? 
In both cases, the new administration runs a severe risk of failure and 
could end up being characterised as both dovish and idealistic. 
Conclusion: When the Obama vision confronts the real world 
Barack Obama made the strategic choice of distancing himself clearly and 
unequivocally from his predecessor on the international scene. It is not only 
an issue of public diplomacy and good PR; change has happened and the 
president has been extremely successful in transforming, in less than six 
months, the image of the US in the world. This has given him more 
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leverage than G.W. Bush to address some of the toughest challenges ahead 
of him. 
The difficulty is that ‘it takes two to tango’. The policy of negotiation 
and engagement will succeed if and only if strategic partners such as 
Russia and regional players such as Iran agree to engage and participate in 
this radical change in security relations. 
On many of the challenges described above, the Obama 
administration seems to have a clear vision – a roadmap for 
implementation, but it runs the risk of failure. This very ambitious agenda 
and Obama’s ability to truly implement change is therefore dependent on 
his capacity to turn his political credit and his policy of engagement into 
concrete steps to achieve his objective. He has the talent and the team to 
succeed, but the challenges ahead should not be underestimated. 
In a nutshell, the task ahead is to convince the rest of the world, including 
the most hostile countries, to share his vision of international affairs in 
order to turn it into a new foreign policy. In other words, to pass the 
reality check. 
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A Russian Perspective 
Ivan Safranchuk* 
bama’s new administration raised many hopes around the world 
and Moscow has also been receiving positive signals. President 
Obama is clearly committed to redressing the imbalances left by the 
Bush administration.  
Russian-US relations have gone through several phases in the past 
two decades. In the early 1990s, Moscow trusted Washington and sought to 
establish the friendliest possible relations with the US. However, influential 
Russian political circles and society at large soon came to think that the 
United States was betraying Russia’s new confidence. In the second half of 
the 1990s, differences between the two countries increased, culminating in 
the spring of 1999 when NATO launched a military operation against 
Yugoslavia.  
From the very beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin has 
sought rapprochement with Western countries. Real results came in 2001, 
after the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington. However, the 
period of Russia and the US being united by a common enemy proved to 
be short-lived. Mutual mistrust and real tactical and strategic 
disagreements centred on a new conflict – the war in Iraq in 2003. This 
time, Moscow was not alone; it stood united with Paris and Berlin. 
Both parties needed a formula for their relations that would give 
them room for differences, but which would keep these differences under 
control. And such a formula did materialise – in the form of an ‘agreement 
to disagree’. Moscow and Washington informed each other about their 
differences and put them on record, but refrained from confrontation. This 
formula helped each of the two countries manage their differences. 
Russia and the United States had a common interest – neither wanted 
to be on different sides of the barricade in a global conflict. Cooperation 
might succeed or it might not, but what mattered most was avoiding 
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confrontation. The ‘agree to disagree’ formula met this interest. Soon, 
however, further details became clear. 
Moscow quickly discovered that being heard did not necessarily 
mean being heeded. The West listened attentively to Russia, but used its 
right to ‘disagree’. Thus, nothing really changed in practice. There was a 
political coup in Georgia in 2003. Russia did not mind at all if Eduard 
Shevardnadze was replaced, but it expected that a new presidential 
candidate be agreed upon jointly with Tbilisi. In 2004, Moscow and 
Washington once again found themselves in opposite camps in the political 
struggle in Ukraine. 
Russia saw its interests attacked in Eastern Europe and in the 
Caucasus, and reacted by putting pressure on US interests in Central Asia. 
In 2005, the United States had to withdraw its military base from 
Uzbekistan, while another US base – in Kyrgyzstan – has been under 
constant pressure ever since. 
The United States was also dissatisfied with the deal. It had thought 
that Russia would not go any further than expressing its discontent with 
US policies and would not play a game of its own against US interests. 
Washington was therefore surprised when Moscow did not let it ‘crush’ 
Iran and when it did not back US policy in Lebanon, instead supporting 
Syria, politically at the UN Security Council and militarily by supplying it 
with air defence systems. Russia also supported Venezuela and started 
putting all-out pressure on pro-American regimes in Eastern Europe and 
then in the Caucasus. Moscow did not intend to give in whenever the 
United States declared its interests. 
Russia’s conduct ran counter to Washington’s interpretation of the 
‘agree to disagree’ formula. In 2006 and 2007, the US adjusted it and 
transformed it into ‘disagree but do not oppose’. Such a formula could be 
interesting for Russia if the parties divided the world into zones of 
influence and responsibility. Then they could disagree about each other’s 
actions inside these zones, but would not interfere in the affairs of the other 
party’s zone. However, Washington did not want to divide the world into 
such zones. And now Moscow is not very eager to do that either, as it can 
play a game of its own on a large scale and there is no longer the need for it 
to artificially narrow the playing field. 
However, without separate zones of influence/responsibility, the US 
‘disagree but do not oppose’ formula made no sense. The United States also 
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found it unattractive when it began to be rebuffed and asked not to 
interfere in Russian policies. 
The ‘agree to disagree’ formula became outdated and outlived its 
usefulness by the end of 2006. Its potential was simply exhausted, but no 
new solutions have yet been found. Many disagreements have piled up 
over the past five years. By the end of his presidency, Vladimir Putin could 
no longer hush them up – hence his famous ‘Munich speech’. Still, neither 
Moscow nor Washington wanted an open confrontation. 
All attempts to invent a ‘joint agenda’ for the two countries 
nevertheless failed. To paraphrase a well-known saying, it was: “Nothing 
personal, just no business”. Putin and Bush had no ‘personal’ problems. 
But Russia and the United States had no joint business either. Their 
statements on the joint struggle against terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, etc., never materialised into any joint 
business. 
The geopolitical and geostrategic interests of Moscow and 
Washington have been diverging rapidly. The two countries now have 
incompatible interests in the energy sector, as well as in certain 
geographical areas. Soon they may use the phrase ‘nothing personal, just 
business’, only each party will have a business of its own, and their 
businesses will compete with each other. 
The parties missed a real opportunity to harmonise their interests and 
achieve strategic solutions on partnership and joint actions in 2004-05, 
during the second wave of leadership replacement in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. Russia and the US started games of their own, placing 
them on different sides of the barricades in Ukraine and Georgia, and 
somewhat earlier in Moldova, which was torn apart by territorial conflict. 
The parties are now unable to give up their positions and will play out their 
games to the end, which may well take a long time. 
These years also saw fundamental differences between the two 
countries in their Middle Eastern policies (Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and the 
Palestinian issue) and the beginning of their rivalry in the energy sector. 
Moscow began to work out its own conceptual approaches to energy 
security issues, which were at variance with those of the US. Since then, 
Russia and the US have been acting strictly in their own interests. 
Russia feels that it is strong enough to play a game of its own. The 
United States fears that Russia is not reformed and responsible enough, 
and this is why it wants to keep an eye on it and restrict it wherever 
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possible. On the other hand, Washington does not want to annoy Moscow 
and prefers soft forms of control, such as joint actions, cooperation, etc. 
A paradoxical situation has thus arisen. Russia wants to cooperate 
with the US (especially on various security matters) – but on a 
pronouncedly equal footing. Such cooperation would emphasise the new 
quality of Moscow and its foreign policy. However, in response to its 
willingness to cooperate, Russia sees US attempts to organise interaction as 
a means of actually containing, blocking and restricting it. 
Russia needs forms of cooperation that would emphasise its 
independence and significance – that is, forms of cooperation, rather than 
Russia’s assistance with some US affairs. For its part, the United States 
needs interaction that would not leave Russia on the sidelines and, at the 
same time, would not give it the power of veto. 
The Georgian crisis of 2008 put an end to the protracted period of 
uncertainty in Russia-US relations, which had lasted for approximately 
three years. President Vladimir Putin made a decisive breakthrough 
towards Russia’s integration into the global economy and politics. The 
view prevailed in Russia then that the country could adapt to the new 
global rules without harming its national interests and even that it could 
implement them more fully. The US position after September 11, 2001 gave 
grounds to believe that Russia’s position could be explained to Washington 
and that the latter could accept it on certain terms. In other words, Russia 
believed that it could reach an understanding with the US. 
However, practical moves to reach this understanding invariably 
failed after 2003. Yet it seemed that the parties could at least not play 
against each other openly. Events in Ukraine in 2004 and in the Middle East 
after 2005 left no hope for that. In the past three years, Russian and US 
interests have clashed constantly. The United States wondered why Russia 
would not give in, while Moscow became increasingly annoyed at the very 
idea that it should give in. 
Relations between Russia and the United States are now taking on a 
new quality. They are not yet confrontational (at least, not in the cold war 
sense), but they are not in partnership either – the parties have failed to 
find cooperation formats that would suit them both, and now their interests 
are diverging as well. Moscow and Washington can cooperate on certain 
individual issues, but strategically they are now on their own. 
For the rest of the world, the transformation of Russian-US relations 
was largely unexpected. Europe stands to gain most from it – if, of course, 
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it dares one day to do something independently and use some of the 
opportunities given to it by the modern world. The lack of systemic 
confrontation between Russia and the United States leaves Europe free to 
not make a decisive choice between the two powers. The Old World can 
behave flexibly, in some cases supporting Russia, while in others 
supporting the United States. For Europe, this is a chance to finally begin to 
act in accordance with its own interests. 
For China, it is somewhat surprising that Russia and the United 
States have found themselves in this situation. But China will hardly be 
displeased by such a state of affairs in the short term. Rather, Beijing will 
not believe it for some time; interpreting the development of Russian-US 
relations as a move towards confrontation (which has not yet been 
completely ruled out, but is not predetermined either – at least, it will not 
be a deliberate choice on the part of Moscow or Washington). As a result, 
China will probably continue to act in accordance with the old logic of 
Henry Kissinger – that is, the logic of a ‘strategic triangle’ among Russia, 
China and the US, where rapprochement between any two parties will 
necessarily make the third one lose. However, the new quality of Russian-
US relations rules out the ‘strategic triangle’ logic. 
The other two countries of the so-called BRIC – Brazil and India – will 
benefit somewhat from the new quality of Russian-US relations. As they do 
not need confrontation with America, or to make excessive concessions to 
it, Moscow’s new position will give them further opportunities to uphold 
their interests. In general, the advancement by Russia of the BRIC format in 
recent years, where the parties discuss the agendas of the UN Security 
Council and the G8, apparently reflects this transition by Moscow to 
fundamentally new foreign policy positions.  
On the whole, the new quality of Russian-US relations is another 
essential element of the multipolar nature of the world. A confrontational 
model stems from the bipolar past. Partnerships and alliances are elements 
of either ‘friendly bipolarity’, which never materialised, or of a unipolar 
world under US leadership, which also failed to deliver. 
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A Chinese Perspective 
Shen Dingli* 
A superpower under transformation 
As the sole superpower in the world, the United States is experiencing an 
important era of transformation. 
Economically, the US is an unmatched and unrivalled power in the 
world, with its economy three times bigger than the second and third 
biggest economies in the world, Japan and China, and with a per capita 
income 20% greater than Japan’s and 13 times greater than that of China. 
There are a few countries in the world that boast an even bigger per capita 
economic output than that of the US, but their populations are far smaller 
than the colossal US population. 
Militarily, the US now spends 47% of the world’s total defence 
budget. The US is the only country in the world that has various regional 
commands beyond its territory, even including a command of celestial 
space. It seems that America is the only country that can wage a war in any 
part of the world at short notice – the war on Iraq in 2003 being such an 
example. 
While America is currently at its peak, the country is also facing 
serious challenges, however. 
Politically, the US democracy did not function well enough to 
forestall Bush’s war on Iraq. In fact, at a time of crisis such as the 9/11 
terrorist attack, the US democracy failed to work adequately to assure the 
defence of the country. The US invaded Iraq without UN authorisation or 
evidence that Iraq posed a serious enough threat to America to warrant a 
pre-emptive strike. The Bush government set up prisons in Guantanamo 
Bay and elsewhere and abused the rights of prisoners. While the Obama 
administration has been talking about withdrawing troops from Iraq, 
America has neither apologised to Iraq and the world for breaking 
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international peace, nor committed itself to bringing those who started the 
war to International Court. The White House has shown no interest in 
providing Iraq with war reparations. The damage this has done to US 
democracy and its leadership role in the world is not easily reparable. 
Economically, the ethos of free capitalism in America has also been 
challenged, especially by the present financial crisis. A combination of 
human greed, a lack of adequate governmental regulation and monitoring, 
plus the impact of the 9/11 attack on consumption and saving behaviour,1 
have all resulted in an unprecedented economic crisis that has shaken the 
credibility and viability of American capitalism. While the lack of next 
generation technology may partly contribute to the deteriorating situation, 
it is also obvious that the US financial institutions are to undergo a major 
revamp. 
This explains why President Obama has come to power after only a 
short stint as politician in Washington, D.C. His commitment to change has 
already refreshed the image of America worldwide. In recent months, the 
Obama administration has succeeded in ‘resetting’ relations with Russia, 
and is also to address difficult questions with Russia on missile defence in 
Central Europe and the NATO membership of Georgia. The US has 
managed to repair the transatlantic relationship with its NATO allies and is 
re-committed to a multilateral foreign policy approach. Washington has 
also stabilised relations with Beijing. Furthermore, President Obama has 
made reconciliatory gestures towards Iran, Cuba and Venezuela, calling for 
dialogues with these countries. President Obama has even envisioned a 
world free of nuclear weapons in which the US plays a leadership role. 
Although the rebuilding of the US global position will be a long 
process, it has taken a constructive new turn already. In the meantime, it is 
still far from certain that the American economy will ride out the most 
serious difficulties it is currently facing. America has not yet returned to the 
heyday of the Clinton era, however. In terms of foreign policy, the US is 
hopeful to be able to reassert its leadership, if it can only deal with its ‘anti-
terror’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably well. But so far there is no 
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certainty that it can fix the deep flaws within its free capitalist system any 
time soon. 
Shifting centres of power 
Against this backdrop, the US is losing some of its power and lustre. Its 
economic weight today is less than one quarter of the world’s total, 
declining from one half at the end of WWII. With military spending at 
nearly one half of the world’s total, the US overspend on defence has 
undermined the country’s position, especially at a time of security 
uncertainty. 
In addition, among the traditional players of Western industrialised 
economies, many have been slow to generate new competitiveness in past 
decades. Therefore, the traditional G7/G8 is defining the world economy 
and world security less and less. Instead, the new grouping of G13/G20 
countries is becoming more relevant in forecasting trends in world 
development. 
In this regard, Asia is increasingly relevant in the shifting centre of 
world power. In particular, East Asia has become a world economic engine, 
with Japan, China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the core actors in the 
contemporary wave of industrialisation. Both Japan and the ROK are 
members of the OECD already, given their economic weight and per capita 
performance. Mainland China’s pace of development is more impressive as 
it is quite possible that its economic size will overtake Japan’s this year, 
rendering China second only to the US in the world in terms of overall size 
of economy. 
Meanwhile, this part of the world includes most of the BRIC nations – 
China, Russia and India – along with Brazil (and potentially Indonesia) – 
they represent the fastest developing economies. Prior to the financial crisis 
of 2008, these economies maintained a rather impressive pace of economic 
development, given their substantial supply of human resources (at least in 
the case of China and India) or natural resources (in the case of Russia). 
Presently, the Chinese economy maintains a positive and impressive 
growth – at 9.1% in 2008 – compared with all other major economies that 
were declining at this time. 
The world order is certainly being restructured. With or without the 
economic downturn, the Chinese economy has a good chance of catching 
up with America in terms of quantity, by 2020-2030. This is assured at a 
time of globalisation, when Western capitals are matched with inexpensive 
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labour resources – abundantly available in the Chinese market or 
elsewhere. As long as China is an open economy, its traditional liability of 
having huge numbers of poor unemployed human resources will turn out 
to be an asset for economic cooperation with the West. 
On closer inspection, even if the Chinese economy matches that of 
Japan in 2009/2010, China’s per capita economic output will merely be 10% 
of that of Japan. Also, even if the Chinese economy is eventually on a par 
with that of the US, its per capita performance will only be about one 
quarter of America’s, compared to the current ratio of 7%. It would be no 
surprise if China surpasses Japan and the US, eventually. What is a surprise 
is why China’s per capita GDP is now only 7% of the US, and 9% of 
Japan’s. 
When China’s economic size grows to match America’s, it will also 
reach that of the EU. The size of the Chinese economy is already 4 times 
greater than that of India, so it is not unthinkable that China will overtake 
India, when Beijing matches Washington around 2020-2030. 
Defence-wise, China’s growth is also rather impressive. Currently, 
China’s official defence budget of $70B (RMB¥480B) is the 3rd biggest in the 
world, next to that of the US and the UK.2 Although China’s defence 
budget is just 1/7 of the US budget, it doubles every four years (or 
quadruples every eight years). This means that China’s defence budget will 
reach $280B by 2017 – the same level as US military spending in 2000, or 
58% of the US in 2008. This does not include any defence R&D with costs 
incurred by non-military departments, the retirement compensation for 
military personnel incurred by civilian departments, or the differences due 
to purchasing power parity between the Chinese currency and the US 
dollar. 
A new world order through cooperation 
Such rapid growth is likely to have an impact. On the one hand, the long-
term relative decline of the US is unavoidable, given the emergence of East 
Asian economies and the newly industrialising markets worldwide, 
                                                     
2 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 
2009, China’s defence spending has already overtaken that of the UK to become 
second only to that of America. See, SIPRI Yearbook (2009) “Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security”, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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including those in the BRIC nations. On the other hand, until November 
2008, China’s economic miracle indicated the arrival of a unique competitor 
for America. 
But the Chinese phenomenon may not be sustainable. Although all 
major Western economies are mired in the financial disaster, China’s 
performance is also in doubt. China’s GDP growth has dropped from 13% 
in 2007 to 9.1% in 2008, and most recently its GDP is only 6.8% (4th quarter 
in 2008) and 6.1% (1st quarter in 2009) of what it was the same season a year 
ago. 
Chinese’s high dependence on exports has brought a tremendous 
boost to the economy. But at a time when the US and other Western 
economies are facing a confidence crisis in consumption and credit, and 
when their need to outsource China’s production is fast shrinking, China is 
meeting its own structural problem of lacking sufficient domestic 
consumption, despite its large savings. 
China is unlikely to replace America in the near future for a number 
of other reasons. Fundamentally, China has not established a culture of 
technological innovation to upgrade its economy through its own efforts. 
China’s dire environmental and ecological degradation simply harms its 
own chances of sustainable development – this fact is even more evident 
and significant in the present financial crisis. 
Although China is hopeful of surpassing America in terms of 
economic size in one or two decades, it still has to expand its economy two 
fold at least. This implies further unprecedented environmental challenges 
and energy needs. Without resolving these problems, further economic 
expansion in China on a massive scale could be the catalyst for ecological 
catastrophe and huge social instability, and is therefore unattainable. 
Failing this, China would not only be unable to boost its economy to 
become a peer of America, but could become a source of global concern. 
This is not a welcome scenario, for either China or the rest of the world. It 
will be in the interests of all concerned to avoid such an occurrence through 
international cooperation. 
President Obama has revoked his predecessor’s handling of 
environmental policy and is now committed to the reduction of greenhouse 
gases. This presents China with both pressures and opportunities – 
obliging them to spend more on environmental protection and cut the net 
increase of wealth generation. But it is in China’s interests to do this sooner 
rather than later. Though it might be hard for the Chinese government to 
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accept a rigid quota of CO2 reduction for some version of a post-Kyoto 
Protocol agreement, it cannot fail such a litmus test at the UN Copenhagen 
Climate Conference this December. 
A short-sighted vision cannot bring China to the truly competitive 
position of deserving G2 status with the US. This would mean the Chinese 
leadership balancing its short-term interests in assuring job employment 
and social stability, with its long-term interests in assuring sustainability, 
both of which are crucial to the legitimacy of the government. 
For America’s part, it has to play a leadership role in curtailing CO2 
emissions, and inducing other countries to commit to doing so, 
commensurate with their economic affordability. If the US fails to negotiate 
with China on mutually acceptable terms, the ensuing disaster will be of 
global proportions, considering that both countries are top emitters of 
greenhouse gases. 
At least for the next 10-20 years, the US position as sole superpower 
will not be challenged. American competitiveness in terms of its natural 
resources, geo-strategic edge, political institutions, technological 
innovation, research and educational competence, all enjoy a certain edge. 
China has certain inherent disadvantages at per capita level: a shortage of 
natural resources, including clean water, a lack of ready energy supplies 
and efficiency of use, a scarcity of education resources, let alone the need to 
reconstruct China’s social ethics in this new millennium. 
But China does not need to wait to catch up with America to play a 
globally constructive role. Already, China has been convening the Six Party 
Talks to play a pivotal role in Northeast Asian security, and has sent its 
ships to the Gulf of Aden to protect international sea lanes against pirates. 
Reportedly, China has sent more UN Peacekeepers than other countries to 
conflict-stricken areas, including Darfur. China is also the biggest donor 
amongst all developing countries, so far having provided official 
development aid to other developing countries; a total of RMB¥200B 
(US$29B). 
It is also worth mentioning that China has worked strenuously to 
settle the North Korean nuclear issue. Fundamentally, this nuclear issue is 
an obstacle to relations between North Korea (DPRK) and the US. The 
mutual hostility between Washington and Pyongyang has ultimately led 
the DPRK to move towards nuclear armament. After the failures of his 
predecessors over this issue, President Obama is now under some pressure 
to resolve the issue peacefully. 
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Although the Obama administration has made diplomatic moves to 
nearly all rival states, the new US leadership has been slow to initiate a 
strategy to ensure denuclearisation and peace on the Korean peninsula. It 
seems too late to reverse the nuclear course of the DPRK, in view of its 
second nuclear testing. However, the Obama administration has succeeded 
in garnering international support to exert pressure on the DPRK, and 
China is a key player in this effort. 
To sum up, the US is now experiencing a more complex relationship 
with China – more cooperation combined with more competition. Though 
China won’t be a serious competitor to America in any time soon, Beijing 
might already have posed a challenge to Washington in some ways. The 
Bush administration’s disastrous unilateral foreign policy, as well as 
China’s success in economic development, have already afforded China 
more influence in the world. China’s persistent low-key posture had made 
its peaceful rise more or less accepted by America and its allies. One can 
expect that in the next decade or two, America’s hegemony is unchallenged 
while China’s will be in the ascendant. This is perhaps the world order that 
many can contemplate over the next two decades. 
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Somali Piracy: 
Historical Context and Political Contingency 
David Anderson* 
The problem 
Even though kidnappings, killings, attacks on UN and NGO compounds, 
suicide bombings, and the assassinations of local judges and other public 
figures, and the many other features of lawlessness in the Horn of Africa 
have become so commonplace that they are rarely now reported by 
European news media, from September 2008 Somalia once again 
dominated the news agenda. In that month pirates operating from small 
ports and harbours along Somalia’s eastern coast mounted a series of 
successful attacks against international shipping, first capturing a 
Ukrainian vessel with its cargo of heavy armaments bound for southern 
Sudan (via the Kenyan port of Mombasa), and then intercepting a number 
of container ships before mounting an attack on a passenger vessel that was 
repelled by the crew. Finally, in November, the pirates landed the prize of a 
fully-laden Saudi-owned oil tanker. By the end of the year the pirate gangs 
operating out of Eyl, Haradheere and other harbours along the desolate 
eastern coast of Puntland, were reckoned to be holding no fewer than 40 
vessels for ransom, with more than 200 crew members in captivity.  
As analysts belatedly got to grips with this story, the world came to 
realise that Somali piracy had been a serious problem for a long time. The 
events of the closing months of 2008 only reached global attention because 
of the cargoes and value of the shipping captured. In fact, ransoms had 
regularly been paid out by all the major international nautical insurers to 
free other captured shipping over the previous decade. During 2008 alone, 
it was estimated (though no one can know the true figure because of the 
secrecy of the insurers and ship-owners) that ransoms worth above US $45 
million had been paid out to recover vessels and crew from Somali hands.  
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By the time another spate of attacks materialised in April 2009, 
American and international naval task forces were operating in the region 
to protect shipping, and international anxiety had come to focus on the 
potential links that might exist between Somali pirates and Islamic 
terrorists. Piracy was most commonly presented as a function of Somali’s 
‘failed state’ – perpetrated along a coastline with no state defences, no 
customs authorities, and no national navy. The presence of known 
terrorists in the southern Somali towns of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the 
strengthening of the Al Shabaab movement, especially following the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in January 2009, framed America and 
European concerns.1 The weakness and corruption of reconstructed but as 
yet internationally unrecognised governments in Gerowe (Puntland) and 
Hargeisa (Somaliland) only served to emphasise the lawless and 
apparently unregulated political economy of the region.  
Many assumptions about the Somali state and its failure underlie the 
analysis of the piracy threat and its causes, but in this paper I wish to refute 
all of them and instead offer a more historical and contextualised 
explanation of what has been happening and what its causes might be. Let 
us begin by challenging five commonly repeated assumptions about ‘the 
pirate problem’: 
1. Piracy along the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is not a 
new phenomenon – far from it: piracy here has a deep and rich 
history, embedded in a maritime economy.  
2. Piracy is not linked to Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia, and nor is 
it promoted in support of terrorism or the funding of terrorism. This 
is not to say that terrorists have not sought to tax the activity of 
pirates – the point is one of cause and effect. Fundamentalism and 
terrorism are explicitly not the causes of piracy. 
3. Piracy is not a function of the failure of the Somali state – and this 
assumption has perhaps been the most pervasive yet the most 
                                                     
1 R. Marchal (2007), “Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already 
confusing crisis? The case of Somalia”, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, pp. 1091-
1106; R. Marchal (2009), “A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-
Shabaab”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 381-404; K. Menkhaus 
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September, http://enoughproject.org (accessed 20 October 2008). 
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misleading of all. The reinvigoration of Somali piracy is connected to 
the reconstruction of the state in what was Somalia, not its collapse, 
and its consequences are therefore very serious for the future. 
Strengthening the state will not necessarily lessen piracy, though 
changing the character of the transactions conducted by state actors 
probably will.2 
4. Piracy is not a function of Somalia’s ‘war-lord politics’. This does not 
mean that there are no connections between pirate gangs and the 
political overlords who control the Somali regions, but piracy is not 
promoted or directed by such people.  
5. And lastly, and here we must address some more imaginative aspects 
of the international coverage of the piracy question, Somalia’s pirates 
are not ‘global warriors’ concerned to save our planet from 
exploitation, and nor should they be seen as social bandits seeking to 
achieve a redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor. 
However, this rhetoric has its origins in the historical experience of 
coastal communities over the past 30 years and in dismissing it as a 
motive we should not ignore the deeper message it conveys about the 
stability of the coastal economy.  
None of this is intended to underplay the importance of the piracy 
problem. Somali’s pirates may be young, and they may be naïve in several 
respects, but they are incredibly dangerous and we are right to be deeply 
concerned about the consequences and the implications of their activities. 
But to do that we need to better understand what forces drive those 
activities, firstly by examining the historical context out of which the 
current piracy has emerged, and secondly by identifying the political 
contingencies that affect piracy.  
Historical context  
Eastern Puntland has for centuries been a maritime community. Fisheries 
and the sea dominate the local economy here, and there is also an ocean-
going sea-faring tradition of dhow sailing and of engagement with 
international maritime trades. Red Sea sailors were known in Europe as 
                                                     
2 H. Verhoeven (2009), “The self-fulfilling prophecy of failed states; Somalia, state-
collapse and the global war on terror”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 
3, pp. 405-25. 
36 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
Lascars – communities of these adventurers were to be found in London 
and other major British ports by the eighteenth century: even today there is 
a rest home for retired Somali sailors in Cardiff’s Tiger Bay, with more than 
a dozen elderly Somali seafarers still in residence. Lascars were recruited 
by European shipmasters in the ports of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the 
Gulf of Persia, and the west coast of South Asia. They moved with the 
monsoon around the waters of the northern Indian Ocean, working the 
coastal dhow trade as well as the transcontinental sailing ships that plied 
these waters in increasing numbers from the late-seventeenth-century. 
Majerteen and Hyobo men from the eastern coast of Puntland were 
renowned as hardy and skilled seafarers in these waters, as were those 
recruited from the northern shore of what is now Somaliland, from the 
ports of Berbera and Bosoca.3 
Piracy and other forms of seaborne predation were known to 
Europeans sailing these waters from at least the early eighteenth century. 
But in the age of sail, seaborne piracy here was limited to smaller local 
dhows, these being frequently intercepted and run down by pirates who 
would seize the cargoes. The dhow trade between the Persian Gulf and the 
coast of Yemen to Berbera, Aden, Djibouti, and Massawa was commonly 
pillaged by pirates from both the Somali and Yemen coasts. Larger ships of 
European type were generally too large and too well-protected to be 
targeted by such activities, and until the opening of the Suez Canal 
relatively few larger vessels passed on the west-east lane through the Gulf 
of Aden. However, the waters around the Somali coast were treacherous to 
shipping in other respects – the currents and tides, and the strength of the 
monsoon making this a notoriously difficult stretch of water for sailing 
ships. The north-eastern and eastern coastlines of Puntland were known for 
these dangers by the early eighteenth century, and by the 1780s there had 
been several infamous cases of shipwreck on this coast with the survivors 
being taken captive and then ransomed by local communities. There was a 
seasonal rhythm to this for the people of coastal Puntland. When the winds 
were fair and the coastal currents good, they engaged in fishing and coastal 
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trading; in the monsoon season they turned to land-borne pursuits and 
harvested the European shipping that floundered on their rocks.4 This 
seasonality still affects the incidence of piracy against dhows along this 
coastline today. 
As Linda Colley’s best-selling history of ransoming, Captives: Britain, 
the Empire and the World 1600-1850, makes clear, the ransoming of captives 
was a long-term strategy of investment that did not necessarily bring early 
results.5 Pirates who hope to accrue from ransoms have always needed 
patience – in the early nineteenth century it might take several months to 
deliver the ransom demand to the shipping agent in Aden or Djibouti, and 
then many months more before a response was received. Among pirates 
here, as in the Caribbean or in North Africa, the short-term gains were from 
the pillaging of cargo; ransoming was a slower and altogether more 
speculative enterprise. The need to keep hostages safe and in good health 
has long been well understood along the Puntland coast. 
Historians writing about the Majerteen and Hobiyo polities provide 
us with details not only of opportunistic pillaging or wrecks and the 
subsequent ransoming of European and Asian captives, but explain how 
lights and fires were set in a purposeful attempt to lure ships onto the 
rocks. Wayne Durrill, writing of Majerteen in the late-eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-century links this explicitly to a political system of predation, 
from which the ruling political elite received rent for every wreck, just as 
they controlled and taxed the fisheries and other trade of the coastal ports 
by this time.6 The Italian historian Battera, whose study of the Puntland 
coast takes us through to the early twentieth century, elaborates on the 
continuation and extension of this predation and its importance in building 
the economic strength of the local Hobiyo and Majerteen polities through 
the systematic payment of tribune.7 Wrecks on the coastline were treated as 
the property of the local sheekh, who was thereby entitled to a share of the 
                                                     
4 W.K. Durrill (1986), “Atrocious misery: the African origins of famine in northeast 
Somalia, 1839-1884”, American Historical Review, Vol. 71, pp. 287-307. 
5 L. Colley (2002), Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850, London: 
Jonathan Cape. 
6 Durrill, op. cit. 
7 F. Battera (2004), Dalla tribu allo Stato nella Somalia nord-orientale: il caso dei Sultanati 
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spoils. This was seen as part and parcel of the political control of, and 
protection of, coastal trading. 
Thus, the role of predation and tribute in shaping the politics of state 
formation in Somalia is clear in the excellent historical work of both Durrill 
and Bottera, linking the maritime economy of the coastal zone to the inland 
economy of pastoral production and agricultural exchange described so 
eloquently in the work of Lee Cassanelli.8 Both coastal historians also make 
the point that it was always the maritime economy that presented the 
opportunities for the more rapid accumulation of wealth by those willing to 
use coercion to exert control of trading networks and those most willing to 
take the risks. 
Smuggling is another element of the maritime economy that we need 
to consider here, because although its importance emerges rather later, it 
has been intimately linked to piracy along the Red Sea Littoral and in the 
Gulf of Aden since the early years of the twentieth century. The second half 
of the nineteenth century saw steam replace sail, thus reducing the 
opportunities for piracy of wrecking against European shipping, yet the 
opening of the Suez Canal saw a dramatic increase in the number of ships 
plying the waters through the Gulf of Aden. From the late nineteenth 
century through to the early twentieth century, piracy in these waters was 
confined to sailing ships, predominantly dhows and the merchant ships 
that plied between the ports of north-east India and the gulf of Aden, and 
thus was very much a local matter affecting trade between the various 
ports of the region. The advent of colonialism at the end of the nineteenth 
century placed those ports in the hands of European governments who 
sought then to tax the intermediaries conducting trade. In an important 
sense, the predation of European colonialisms replaced the predation of 
local sheikhs, but essentially nothing had changed very much. However, 
differences between the laws imposed by the French, Italian and British 
colonialists in this region enhanced the opportunities for smuggling 
between the various jurisdictions – a factor that had already been apparent 
in the trade during the second-half of the nineteenth century. 
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Details of this trade and the rampant smuggling that accompanied it 
are found in Richard Pankhurst’s magisterial survey of the Red Sea ports,9 
and have most recently been elaborated in Jonathan Miran’s wonderfully 
evocative history of the port of Massawa.10 Indian and Arab trading houses 
were well-established in all the ports of the region by this time, and in often 
fiendish competition with one another and with local traders they had 
succeeded in establishing dominant positions over credit provisions in 
many of the key ports. Indian and Arab traders paid their dues in tribute to 
local Somali political leaders, and in return facilitated money-lending to 
local traders, some of whom brought goods to the coast from inland and 
others who were themselves involved in maritime trade. European 
colonialisms brought new currencies into this market, as well as new 
regulations, that saw many of the established trading firms seeking ways to 
avoid colonial oversight so as to maintain their own monopolies and 
privileges. The complexity and intimacy of this history is hinted at in 
Pankhurst’s account of the pricing structures, licensing regimes and tribute 
systems operating in the various ports.11 
By 1919, coastal smuggling was a key issue in the region for all of the 
colonial powers – principally the British in Aden and Berbera, the French at 
Djibouti and the Italians at Massawa and along the eastern Puntland coast 
and down to Mogadishu. The outbreak of the First World War politicised 
this even further, with stories of gun-running across the Red Sea as local 
traders sought to break embargoes and licensing controls – troubles that 
were again to be vigorously renewed with the Italian conquest of Ethiopia 
in 1936 and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. By the 1920s 
stories of smuggling and seafaring adventures in the Red Sea were 
immortalised in the writings of Henry de Montfried, whose 
autobiographical adventures were recorded in more than 20 novels, 
including Hashish – a Smuggler’s Tale, and Smuggling Under Sail in the Red 
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Sea.12 The British suspected de Montfried of running cannabis and guns 
into Djibouti and Massawa from Yemeni coastal ports, and had him 
arrested and his skiff impounded on more than one occasion.  
Illicit maritime trade has a deeply rooted connection to local political 
actors in this region, but there has also always been a very fine line between 
legitimate trade and smuggling. Henry de Montfried had exceedingly good 
relationships with the leading coastal sheikhs on the Somali and Yemeni 
coastlines and was a close associate of the main European merchants who 
were involved in coastal trade. Among these was a fellow Frenchman 
named Antonin Besse, who ran what was by the late-1920s the region’s 
largest trading company, based in Aden. Besse employed de Montfried 
many times to run trade goods in the region, and his good name became 
briefly somewhat besmirched by this association – especially during the 
1940s when de Montfried again fell under grave suspicion of gun-running.  
Although local smuggling remains vibrant and economically 
important, by the 1950s we hear less about international piracy in this 
region, although there are occasional incidents of tourist yachts being 
caught up and attempts to ransom the crew. Local piracy against dhow 
traders and fishing vessels continues, however, records of which are to be 
found in the British Colonial Office papers on Somaliland right up until 
independence at the beginning of the 1960s. 
The emphasis of the maritime economy of the Somali coast shifted 
very emphatically in the 1960s as Cold War politics blew into the Horn. 
Russian support for Somalia brought a strong military presence to the 
coastline, with Berbera and Mogadishu’s port facilities being heavily 
militarised and internationalised. The Soviets also brought Somalia a 
sophisticated and modern fishing fleet for the exploitation of its own 
coastal waters, and with this commercial fishing new kinds of 
opportunities for predation were created. 
As far as we can tell from limited sources, sporadic smuggling 
continued through the smaller ports and harbours of Somalia throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s with virtually no controls by the state – “it has always 
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been this way” as one elderly fisherman told an American journalist back 
in November 2008. The appalling economic management of the Said Barre 
government, which saw corruption and rent-seeking invade virtually every 
facet of Somali public life during the 1970s finally spiralled into financial 
collapse by the mid-1980s with the rapid re-invigoration of local political 
actors in directing economic activities in each part of the country. The 
maritime economy suffered in the management and the collapse of the 
Barre regime, along with all other aspects of the Somali economy.  
Political contingency 
The political difficulties of Somalia since 1991 have been well documented. 
Here I will restrict myself to five brief points relating to the maritime 
economy. 
(a) Fisheries and coastal customs 
French political scientist Roland Marchal is a long-time critic of the 
simplicities with which the world tends to consider Somalia’s problems. 
His view of the current piracy crisis is typically trenchant. Marchal makes a 
connection between piracy and the collapse of international fisheries along 
the coast.13 To that we can add analysis of the efforts by Puntland’s putative 
government to get a grip on its ports and harbours to give a more rounded 
view of how fisheries and customs issues have impacted very directly upon 
the recent upsurge of piracy. 
Marchal reminds us that piracy was intimately connected “with the 
early stage of the civil war and the international intervention”.14  Before 
1991, there were very few attacks on international shipping, but with the 
collapse of the Barre government, harbour and port facilities became prizes 
to be won in the struggle for economic resources. In December 1989 a 
Somali rebel group, the Somali National Movement, seized an oil tanker 
and two other ships off the Somali coast, and issued warnings to 
international shippers not to deal with the “dying Somalia regime”. These 
‘pirates’ off-loaded everything they could from the ships before releasing 
them early in 1990. There has been a pattern of interference with 
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international shipping that has been slowly escalating in the waters off 
Somalia ever since; the reason is to be found in the economic importance of 
maritime resources. 
This is most clearly seen in relation to the fishing industry. Having 
run a successful large-scale fishing industry out of Mogadishu from the 
early 1960s, the ships and infrastructure of this Somali enterprise gradually 
fell into disrepair and disuse after 1977. In 1983 the Somali government 
entered a new agreement with an Italian firm (the Somali High Seas Fishing 
Company, known as SHIFCO), which provided a fleet of five trawlers and 
one freezer mother ship to supply fish caught off Somalia to Italy and the 
EU. When the Barre government collapsed, SHIFCO relocated its base to 
Yemen, from where the company was run by close associates of the Barre 
family. In an effort to retain a monopoly of off-shore trawling, SHIFCO 
allegedly paid monies at this point to leading Somali political figures to 
engage their support.  
This arrangement initially succeeded in securing SHIFCO’s interest, 
but was soon challenged as the various factions that emerged after the fall 
of Barre turned against one another and began to compete to control 
economic resources. Rival political elites began to support other contractors 
to fish in Somali waters, while ships from other international countries now 
flooded into Somali waters undermining SHIFCO’s monopoly. Marchal 
reports that the UNOSOM Justice Commission looked at this issue in 1993, 
but elected not to seek to interfere with SHIFCO’s contract. In the 
meantime, the various political factions with interests in the ports along the 
coast began to compete against each other to tax the industry, with the first 
incidents of local boats seeking to interfere directly with the trawlers 
operating off-shore. To do this, local sailors needed larger, faster boats, and 
they began the process of improving their technology accordingly. 
The foundation of the new ‘state’ of Puntland in the late 1990s 
brought this to a head. The government of Abdullaahi Yuusuf wanted to 
gain revenues from taxing off-shore fisheries, and so employed a private 
security firm, Hart, to administer its ports and coastal customs. Stig Jarle 
Hansen’s excellent article, published in Review of African Political Economy in 
December 2008, explains how this apparent ‘liberalisation’ and ‘security’ 
measure in fact played into local politics between rival factions in the war 
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to gain tribute.15 Hart ultimately failed to secure the ports of Puntland, but 
in the process they employed and trained a good number of local men – 
perhaps as many as 40 in all – in the use of GPS, maritime tracking and 
security methods, and the techniques of apprehending, boarding and 
securing ‘suspect’ shipping in hostile waters. There is good reason to 
suspect that Hart’s former employees are prominent among the gangs now 
preying upon shipping off the Somali coast.16 With a combination of 
improved technology and know-how (computer tracking and 
communications equipment), heavy weaponry (rocket-propelled grenades 
capable of piercing the hull of a vessel), and excellent local seamanship (in 
the form of local fishermen who know the waters, tides and currents of this 
difficult coast), the most professional of the pirate gangs is now capable of 
running down large international shipping and at increasing distances 
from the shore.  
(b) Political transitions (Islamic courts) 
The American-sponsored Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was designed to 
remove elements from Mogadishu who were believed to be operating in 
support of fundamentalist Islamic politics in general, and the interests of 
anti-America terrorist groups in particular. The Islamic Courts 
administration that had taken over in Somalia’s former capital had 
certainly restored many elements of sharia law, and there were almost 
certainly a number of wanted men in hiding in Mogadishu – though 
whether they were under the protection of local political elites or not is a 
moot point. Yet, as Hassan and Barnes, among many others, have forcibly 
pointed out, the Islamic Courts government enjoyed a high degree of local 
support and credibility precisely because they were successful in restoring 
a degree of order to the city and its suburbs, bringing back trade and other 
civil activities to the great benefit of the local population.17 Most 
importantly, they also controlled the undisciplined and predatory militias 
whose greed and extortion was inflicting misery on all of those seeking to 
                                                     
15 S.J. Hansen (2008), “Private security and local politics in Somalia”, Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 118, pp. 585-98. 
16 R. Middleton (2008), Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars, 
Chatham House, Africa Programme Briefing Paper, October. 
17 C. Barnes & H. Hassan (2007), “The rise and fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts”, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 151-60.  
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restore business and service provision in the city. One of the positive 
aspects of the period in which the Islamic Courts ran Mogadishu was the 
improvements in port security around the harbour area, and the clearing 
out from Mogadishu of a number of private groups who were preying 
upon local shipping in the area. 
Did the demise of the Islamic Courts then spawn a rise in piracy? No 
– that is too simple a conclusion: but their presence reinforced a degree of 
political order in which criminal activity in general was suppressed. Somali 
piracy needs to be understood as a criminal activity, not a political act.  
To what extent is the resurgence of piracy on the Puntland coast 
therefore a feature of criminality emanating from Puntland’s political elite 
in Gerowe? The government in Gerowe wishes to be viewed as a Western 
ally, and thereby hopes to gain international legitimacy. But in seeking to 
maintain local support, politicians in Gerowe cannot afford to be too 
closely identified with the Ethiopian invasion or directly with US policy. It 
is undoubtedly the case that some prominent politicians and business 
people in Gerowe have close links to the pirate gangs and their financiers. 
In Gerowe’s difficult political environment, a blind-eye has been turned to 
those among the Gerowe administration who benefit in the form of tribute 
by maritime predation.  
(c) Criminality and the economy 
As with the case of the Balkans in the 1990s, the emergence of criminal 
networks amid reconstruction has been dismissed in Puntland and 
Somaliland as a ‘merely-to-be-expected’ opportunistic response to political 
transition. Only later did those involved in the Balkans come to see the 
dangers of letting criminal factions into the very heart of government in 
this crucial transitional phase.18 Are we repeating the same mistake in the 
horn of Africa? Embedded criminality is extremely difficult to dislodge 
from government, as we have subsequently learned in the Balkans, in some 
of the former Soviet republics, and most recently in Croatia. In Africa, 
parallels to the Somali case are to be seen in DRC, and also in Liberia. 
                                                     
18 For the broader argument, see R. Naylor (1995), “From Cold War to crime war: 
the search for a new national security threat”, Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, pp. 37-56. 
SOMALIA AND THE PIRATES | 45 
Given its current geo-politics, Somalia appears to be in the process of 
partition.19 And the circumstances of this process is creating a politics in 
which criminality is becoming embedded. It is grimly ironic that Africa’s 
one overtly irredentist post-colonial state should be the one that is first torn 
into pieces. There are three new states in the making at present. 
Somaliland, Puntland, and the residual state of Somalia that is at least 
putatively run from Mogadishu. How legitimate are these new polities? 
The world still hesitates to recognise Somaliland, although it receives 
encouragement and support from a number of countries and through UN 
agencies. Likewise Puntland, the self-proclaimed ‘state-in-the-making’, 
with its capital and so-called ‘transitional government’ at Gerowe. These 
may not be perfect arrangements, but international agencies work with the 
administrations in Hargeisa and Gerowe because some authority is better 
than no authority – of course, so long as this authority is not linked to 
fundamentalist Islam. The administrations of Puntland and Somaliland are 
vehemently opposed to one another, yet they are both acutely aware of the 
need to play politics in a way that will not alienate Western allies. 
(d) The incremental scale of piracy 
There is not yet any clear indication of how many distinct pirate gangs are 
operating from the coast of Somalia, but the best guess puts the figure at 
around ten. Two or three of these are relatively new, the others being 
believed to be long-standing practitioners. Up to 2007, it has been estimated 
that each gang made around a dozen attacks on international shipping per 
year. The apparent up-scaling of pirate activities since 2007 is therefore a 
consequence of only two or perhaps three new gangs coming into 
                                                     
19 For the complex politics of this, see variously: M. Bradbury (2008), Becoming 
Somaliland, Oxford: James Currey; M. Bryden (2003), “No quick fixes: coming to 
terms with terrorism, Islam, and statelessness in Somalia”, Journal of Conflict 
Studies, Vol. 23, Fall, pp. 24-39; A. de Waal (2004), Islamism and its Enemies in the 
Horn of Africa, London: Hurst & Co; T. Hagmann (2005), “From state collapse to 
duty-free shop: Somalia’s path to modernity”, African Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 416, pp. 
525-35; K. Menkhaus (2007), “The crisis in Somalia: a tragedy in five acts”, African 
Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 204, pp. 357-90; K. Menkhaus (2006/07), “Governance without 
government in Somalia: spoilers, state building and the politics of coping”, 
International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 74-106. 
46 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
operation.20 This incremental scale of increase needs to be borne in mind – a 
relatively small investment in equipment and technology, or the relocation 
of pirates from one area to another, or the shifting of a criminal network 
from smuggling into piracy can be sufficient to create the kind of increase 
we have seen in the past two to three years. Given the reported success of 
pirates over the period in persuading insurers to pay ransoms for the ships 
held, it may seem hardly surprising that additional crews have joined in 
the action. 
(e) International architecture 
It has been estimated that ransoms to the value of US $45 million were paid 
out to Somali pirates during 2008. So, where does the average pirate spend 
this money? That of course is the question that leads many advisors on 
international security to worry that this money may find its way into the 
hands of others who have ambitions beyond acquisitive consumerism. But, 
despite claims of the pirates being among the wealthiest of their 
community and anecdotal stories that they are propping up the local 
economy, it is clear that only a tiny fraction of the rewards from piracy 
finds its way back into the local economy. The pirates themselves take 
money and valuables from the ships they attack – they stole $30,000 from 
the safe of the US ship whose captain was taken hostage, for example – and 
parts of cargoes are often sold-off into Somalia’s thriving black economy 
while the ships sit at anchor awaiting the due process of the ransom 
negotiations. The Ukrainian ship carrying the tanks and heavy weapons 
bound for Sudan was only saved from being stripped out and its cargo 
looted because the pirates could not find a way to move the heavy tanks 
and other machinery from the hold. 
The international architecture of the laundering of the money 
delivered for ransom remains hazy, but it is suspected that there are 
connections to members of the Somali diasporas, notably in Dubai and 
Doha. At least some of the money then finds its way back to Somalia via 
legitimate trade exchanges of goods purchased with the ransom earnings, 
to be sure, but the vast bulk of the millions secured through piracy is 
clearly not being invested in the Horn of Africa. 
 
                                                     
20 Middleton, Piracy in Somalia. 
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The Evolution of Piracy 
Rob de Wijk* 
Introduction 
Piracy is not a new phenomenon, but over the years there has been a shift 
towards more advanced, sophisticated and professionalised forms of 
piracy. This paper discusses its evolution and looks at the changing modus 
operandi. Although most piracy attacks are conducted for economic gain, 
politically motivated piracy should not be overlooked. 
Piracy is defined as an “act of boarding or attempting to board any 
ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with 
the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act”.1 
The conclusions and insights provided in this paper are largely derived 
from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies’ (HCSS) piracy database, 
which contains the majority of the incidents as of 2003. Although most of 
the HCSS piracy data are also included in the database of the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the shipping reports of the National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency, the HCSS data also contain information about 
numerous other reported maritime-related security incidents, including 
kidnappings of oil workers and sabotage of oil pipelines, whereby 
maritime operators could be adversely affected. 
Consequences 
As integrated supply chains and ‘just-in-time’ management techniques are 
imperative in today’s global economic environment, new forms of piracy 
                                                     
* The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. 
1 Definition used by International Maritime Bureau (IMB). It is broader in 
comparison to the conceptualisation adopted under the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The latter restricts its focus only to 
attacks that occur on the high seas, which is problematic since the majority of 
piracy incidents take place in territorial or coastal waters. For reasons of brevity, an 
actual or attempted armed robbery directed at a ship that is berthed, anchored or 
at sea is also included under the header of ‘piracy’ in this Future Issue. 
48 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
have important economic repercussions. Disruptions of supply chains and 
increased freight rates have strong implications for the companies involved 
and affect business confidence.2 The IMB estimated that costs related to 
piracy vary between 0.01% and 0.2% of the annual value of maritime 
commerce, which totals almost $8 trillion USD.3 However, systematic 
studies designed to get a substantiated indication of the magnitude of 
economic costs have yet to be undertaken.4 
This does not neglect the fact that the physical and psychological 
consequences of piracy attacks are serious. It is estimated that from 1995 to 
2009,5 around 730 persons were killed or are presumed dead, 
approximately 3,850 seafarers were held hostage, around 230 were 
kidnapped and ransomed, nearly 800 were seriously injured and hundreds 
more were threatened with guns and knives.6 In most cases, the act of 
piracy falls within the category of armed robbery, where pirates board the 
ship and remove valuables from the crew. During the last two years there 
has been a slight increase in attacks committed for the purposes of 
hijacking a ship and kidnapping crew members for ransom. This trend is 
especially prevalent in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden region, where such 
violence accounted for 70% of the world total in 2007 and 80% in 2008. In 
these attacks, the preferred types of weapons are machine guns and rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs), indicating that pirates are becoming 
increasingly ruthless in these areas. 
Modus operandi 
Pirates are aided by the absence of a global law enforcement agency and 
the weak implementation of UN resolutions and maritime security regimes. 
                                                     
2 M. Richardson (2004), “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related 
Terrorism in an Age of WMD”, Institute of South East Asian Studies. 
3 J. Hastings (2009), “Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime 
piracy hijackings”, Political Geography, July; IMB (2007); P. Chalk (2000), “Maritime 
Piracy: A Global Overview”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 8, pp. 47-50. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Year-to-date: 21st October 2009. 
6 HCSS Maritime Security Database (2009); M. Murphy (2007), “Contemporary 
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism”, Adelphi Paper, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Routledge. 
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The establishment of EU and NATO maritime task forces off the coasts of 
Somalia demonstrates that the international community now takes 
implementation more seriously. The deployment of maritime task forces 
indicates that piracy has gone through different stages, causing an 
increasing threat to Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Analyses of 
various databases reveal four forms of piracy. 
Moderate, low-level piracy 
The bulk of these attacks take place in bays, estuaries and archipelagos, 
where favourable geographic circumstances offer the best opportunities for 
pirates.7 In regions where targets are close to shore, berthed in ports or 
sailing through swampy river systems, such as the Niger Delta, South 
American Amazon and the Malacca Straits, low-level piracy is dominant. 
Obviously, these geographical characteristics are not only present in those 
areas; the Everglades and Northern Territory share them as well. However, 
the former are characterised by a high degree of lawlessness, poverty and a 
range of other variables that drive piracy. Pirates are often armed with only 
knives and pistols, while operating from rubber boats or small wooden 
motor boats. The intention of these armed culprits, occasionally disguised 
as naval officers or harbour police, is to ransack the ship and deprive the 
crew of their valuables before disappearing again in the darkness to seek 
refuge in their nearest sanctuaries. In the majority of cases, violence is 
‘limited’ to assault and threatening of victims. 
Advanced, medium-level piracy 
Over the last several years, however, there seems to have been an increase 
in the levels of violence used. Pirates are increasingly employing heavier 
firearms and occasionally end up in gunfights with local authorities and 
naval forces. Mostly, the raids are generally hit-and-run attacks, but next to 
personal valuables specific cargo is often targeted as well. It would 
therefore seem that pirates’ intelligence is getting better. The pirates, 
however, rarely view the cargo as the prime target of the hijacking. The 
main reason for this is that the economic landscape discourages particular 
operations that require a proper infrastructure to offload cargo and sell 
them on the open market. In addition, the lack of a functioning financial 
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
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sector and market system causes the pirates to focus on ransom 
negotiations for ship hijackings and the use of overseas financial networks.8 
On the other hand, pirates in these areas do enjoy the advantage of 
operating in a political and judicial vacuum, meaning they have enough 
time to negotiate ransoms while not being pursued by legal forces. During 
kidnappings in, for example, the Niger Delta, crew members are the prime 
target for demanding ransom or are used as bargaining chips for the release 
of political rebels. By using high-speed boats, these armed assaults not only 
take place in close proximity to the shore, but also at ships anchored several 
nautical miles off coast, or even further up in the exclusive economic zone. 
In some areas, for example in the Horn of Africa, pirates are becoming 
more audacious, even committing attacks in broad daylight and giving 
interviews to various media outlets.9  
Professional, high-level piracy 
In some areas there is the occurrence of a particular type of pirate, with an 
even more sophisticated modus operandi than in the medium-level type of 
piracy. In the professional, high-level category, pirates use AK-47 
automatic machine guns, RPGs and even P4A dynamite to commit attacks 
and threaten crew members. These pirates operate from so-called ‘mother 
ships’ to launch smaller crafts on the high seas, allowing pirates to target 
vessels farther out at sea.10 At present, the poorly policed waters off the 
Somali coast, Gulf of Aden, the Philippines and Southern India are 
particularly prone to this type of attack. The use of these mother ships has 
the implication that the ‘threat-zone’ for ships has expanded significantly. 
A few years ago this ‘threat-zone’ was approximately 50 NM off coast, but 
is already around 1000 NM off the coast of Somalia.11 These pirates tend to 
favour larger vessels, above 10,000 Gross Register Tonnage (GRT), in order 
                                                     
8 J. Hastings (2009), “Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime 
piracy hijackings”, Political Geography, July. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Munich Re (2008), Piracy – Threat at Sea, Münchener Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft, Germany. 
11 On May 2nd 2009, the Malta-flagged Greek tanker, the Ariana, was attacked by 
pirates in the Indian Ocean between the Seychelles and Madagascar, 
approximately 950 NM SE of Mogadishu, while carrying soy from Brazil to Iran 
(http://www.eaglespeak.us/2009/05/somali-pirates-nato-stops-hijack-finds.html). 
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to commit major criminal hijackings and kidnappings of the crew.12 The 
preference for large ships can be explained by the fact that they yield some 
important advantages for the pirates. They generally have more crew 
members on board to kidnap or take hostage, meaning a higher ransom, 
and usually carry goods and commodities, such as palm oil and sugar, 
which sell fast on the ‘black’ market.13 Also, shipping companies that are 
attacked in international waters have, in general, a greater willingness to 
actually pay ransom, since they are better insured in such waters. 
Furthermore, the type of pirates that aim for large cargo ships operate 
under even more complicated circumstances than simply demanding 
ransom. It demands a high level of operational sophistication and 
professionalism to dispose of cargo without getting caught. It is hard to sell 
cargo straight off a hijacked ship, so it has to be stored, requiring a properly 
equipped network of ports, warehouses and commodities markets. Thus, 
pirates need to have a network in place that takes full advantage of the 
complex communication and transportation infrastructure; something 
pirates in Southeast Asia have managed rather successfully over the years.14  
Politically motivated piracy 
In certain cases piracy attacks are politically motivated. This manifestation 
of piracy differs significantly from the varieties described earlier. These 
types of pirates are better described as militants attacking ships or oil 
facilities as a result of local grievances. It is reasonable to assume that these 
politically motivated attacks might morph into ‘pure revenue-seeking’ 
groups, much like FARC in South America switched from political 
movement to narco-terrorism once they found that the attacks were too 
profitable to discontinue. In some cases these piracy attacks may resemble 
maritime terrorism. Their modus operandi classifies them as medium-level 
and high-level forms of piracy. For example, the well-trained and equipped 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) uses M-16 
                                                     
12 Although not their prime targets, pirates do increasingly attack private yachts 
and cruise ships in these waters, whereby seriously wounding or even killing 
unarmed sailors becomes more frequent. 
13 Munich Re (2008), Piracy – Threat at Sea, Münchener Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft, Germany. 
14 J. Hastings (2009), “Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime 
piracy hijackings”, Political Geography, July. 
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assault rifles, AK-47 machine guns, dry explosives and RPGs to attack 
government and oil industry targets.15 A similar situation existed in the oil 
rich Indonesian province of Aceh, where the side effects of lucrative oil 
business in the country created comparable grievances and resistance 
amongst the local population against foreign oil companies and central 
government. The so-called Free Aceh Movement (GAM) specifically 
targeted Exxon Mobil, which in the past led to multiple natural gas and oil 
production shutdowns at the refineries in the Lhok Seumawe Industrial 
Zone.16  
How big is the threat? 
Piracy has always existed but comprehensive piracy records have only 
been kept for a short period of time. This makes it difficult to confidently 
identify clear trends over time.17 Moreover, scholars in the field of piracy 
point to the limitations of collecting statistics on actual and attempted 
piracy attacks. For example, piracy incidents often go unreported due to 
reasons such as intimidation by pirates, fear of reputation damage, fear of 
increased insurance premiums and interpretative discrepancies in the 
definitions of piracy. In spite of these limitations, a short-term trend 
analysis covering the period 2003-2009 year-to-date18 is illustrative. 
 
 
                                                     
15 In their most recent attacks on platform rigs and oil pipelines, the oil production 
is brought down with nearly 1 million bpd, thereby triggering global oil prices 
upwards again (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid= 
aJhJeQ.t3MDk&refer=uk, accessed 18 September 2008). 
16 Finally, as of late December 2005, the GAM and the Indonesian government 
reached a peace agreement, after 26 years of fighting (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
worldservice/learningenglish/newsenglish/witn/2005/12/051214_aceh.shtml). 
17 Piracy reports are only readily available since the 1990s, with very little 
recording before this period. These reports are issued on a regular basis by 
organisations such as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), the UK’s Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the US 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency’s Anti-Shipping Activity Message 
database.  
18 Year-to-date: 21st October 2009. 
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Figure 1. Number of reported piracy incidents 2003-09 (up to 21 October 2009) 
 
Source: HCSS piracy database. 
The waters off Indonesia, the Caribbean and Latin America were 
amongst the highest risk areas in 2003, but witnessed a significant decrease 
in piracy in the following years (90% and 95% respectively). The Singapore 
and Malacca Straits have also seen a decline in reported piracy attacks 
during the last few years (from 209 reported attacks in 2003 to 75 in 2008). 
The affected shipping companies in these areas were increasingly pressing 
littoral states to improve the risk situation. After the Malacca Straits were 
marked as very risky in 2005, shipping companies were forced to pay for 
this enhanced risk. To counter this additional burden, they demanded 
better control, more frequent patrols by the authorities and a better 
cooperation with neighbouring countries. Remarkably, in the years after 
the initiation of ReCAAP19 and the concept of the “Eye in the Sky” joint 
security-initiative to provide cooperative air surveillance over the Malacca 
Straits, piracy attacks in this region began to drop significantly. 
Consequently, some insurance markets, such as Lloyds of London, 
reversed their previous decision and deleted the region from the list of 
enhanced risk areas.20  
                                                     
19 On September 4th 2006 the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) came into force. 
20 Munich Re (2008), Piracy – Threat at Sea, Münchener Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft, Germany. 
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The opposite occurred in Nigerian waters (from 30 reported attacks 
in 2005 to over 140 in 2008) and the Horn of Africa region, where there has 
been a significant rise in piracy activity over the last two and a half years (a 
large increase of more than 220%). Somalia wasn’t always a pirate safe 
haven, but the scourge in attacks can largely be explained by the fact that 
piracy is regarded as a highly profitable business. Pirates make high 
returns on investment, i.e. the huge ransoms paid for a hijacked ship, 
making this type of ‘work’ extremely interesting in a country where the 
average Somali is lucky to earn $600 USD a year.21 Reported incidents in the 
Indian Subcontinent including India and Bangladesh, remained relatively 
stable, but are still responsible for a large proportion of total incidents 
worldwide (averaging around 45 incidents per year since 2003).  
Most piracy incidents worldwide take place near fragile or failed 
states, where there are large ungoverned areas, weak state structures and 
ungoverned territories or ‘black holes’. These areas include Somalia, 
Nigeria, the Indian Subcontinent and areas in the South China Sea. This 
figure illustrates the ports and anchorages with the most piracy incidents 
worldwide. 
Figure 2. Overview of ports and anchorages with high piracy activity 
 
Source: IMB (2008); HCSS (2009). 
                                                     
21 D. Sekulich (2009), Terror on the Seas: True Tales of Modern-Day Pirates, St. Martin’s 
Press, NY, p. 148. 
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Recent trends 
The bulk of attacks occur in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, in 
particular Nigeria and the Gulf of Aden. During the early months of 2009 
there was a spectacular rise in piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia and 
Nigeria. These attacks are more violent and professionally executed. The 
result was increased media attention and a growing political willingness to 
address the problem. Despite this significant rise in the overall amount of 
maritime security incidents compared to 2008, we also observed a relative 
decline in incidents since May 2009.  
Horn of Africa 
The overall level of piracy has decreased in the Horn of Africa since May 
2009, including in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. Still, by June 
2009 the amount of actual and attempted attacks in this region had already 
surpassed the total number of attacks in 2008. The decline of actual attacks 
in the Horn of Africa is partly due to the presence of naval forces in the 
Gulf of Aden, being CTF-151, NATO’s Allied Protector, the EU-NAVFOR 
mission or individual contributions by nation states, which have made it 
more difficult for pirates to actually hijack vessels. To a large degree this 
decline can also be attributed to the stormy weather conditions associated 
with the monsoon season (May until September). The high seas and rough 
winds caused a decrease in piracy activity along the east coast of Africa. 
Despite the adaptive nature of pirates’ tactics, merchant vessels could take 
advantage of the protection offered by monsoon conditions. The likelihood 
of a successful attack in these conditions is considered to be low along 
much of the east coast of Africa, with wind speeds of SW Force 4 or above. 
However, this did not cause Somali pirates to quit their activities. Instead, 
pirate groups such as the ‘Puntland’ and ‘Marka’ groups and the ‘Somali 
Marines’ are seeking new hunting grounds in the southern Red Sea near 
places such as Bab el-Mandeb and in the Arabic Sea near the coast of 
Oman. However, the latest HCSS data indicates that after a period of 
relative calm, Somali piracy surged again from August 2009 onwards. In 
addition, they are becoming much more audacious, committing attacks as 
much as 900 NM offshore, around the Seychelles Islands (and even near the 
Maldives), farther to the south east of Somalia and in the Mozambique 
Channel. Attacks increasingly occurred during the hours of darkness, 
suggesting the need for increased vigilance of shipping vessels at any time 
transiting through the high-risk areas in this region. 
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West Africa 
According to the HCSS dataset, the Gulf of Guinea is the highest risk area 
at the moment, in particular Nigerian waters and the Niger Delta. These 
attacks pose a mounting threat to international shipping and there is a 
growing concern over the increasing level of violence. The naval forces in 
West Africa are ill-equipped to protect merchant vessels – and even local 
fishing boats – against the violent attacks of, in particular, the militant 
groups MEND and the Freelance Freedom Fighters (FFF). Attacks on 
vessels in the Gulf of Guinea, in particular Nigerian waters, are mired in a 
mix of petty crime and politically-motivated violence. In the latter case, the 
types of pirates are better described as militants attacking ships or oil 
facilities as a result of local grievances. In these cases the piracy attacks 
resembles politically motivated piracy (or even maritime terrorism), where 
the economic motivations are not dominant. In an announcement in July 
2009, the European Commission stated that the recent implementation of 
several of its projects in nine states of the Niger Delta (worth over 45 
million euro) was stalled due to disruptive militant attacks.  
Southeast Asia  
A worrying development is the spread of MEND’s militant tactics into 
neighbouring countries through organised criminal gangs and separatist 
movements in, for instance, Cameroon’s Bakassi Peninsula, Angola, Benin 
and Equatorial Guinea. Criminals and militant groups active in these areas 
may have ideological or operational links to the Ijaw’ militants of MEND. 
These groups have stepped up their activities, mounting attacks on targets 
affiliated with the oil and gas industry. The risks to personnel, vessels and 
(sub) contractors in the oil and gas industry are probably more severe than 
in the Horn of Africa. There is an increased awareness that as a result of the 
current economic crisis, low public spending and unemployment could fuel 
the (re)emergence of piracy hotspots in Southeast Asia. ‘Old’ piracy 
networks, as they appeared in the recent past in this region, could re-
emerge in the coming months. Anecdotal evidence suggests that low-
intensity incidents of maritime theft aimed at robbing engines from locals, 
boats and material is thriving again. However, fear exists that these 
criminal groups might copy successful tactics employed by pirates in 
Africa, thus aiming at ransacking more valuable vessels and crew. 
Unfortunately, the bulk of these incidents go unreported by piracy 
reporting centres since they mostly include attacks on (large) commercial 
vessels in their reports.  
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Other regions 
Low-level incidents of piracy and armed robbery are increasing in some 
areas in Latin America, particularly in the waters off Peru, Colombia and 
Brazil. The risk of kidnap-for-ransom is slowly spreading out into 
neighbouring areas. For example, Colombian criminal gangs are spreading 
their activities into Venezuela and Ecuador. Obviously, the local drivers 
behind kidnapping might differ from those in, for example, Nigeria, but it 
is still vital to properly assess the risk to expatriates and local staff. 
Drivers 
We found three main drivers of piracy: opportunity, capability and target. 
These drivers are not only influenced by a combination of several 
underlying variables, they also mutually influence each other. It is this 
interplay between factors that explains the variations of piracy in place and 
over time. 
Opportunity 
Opportunities for criminals to commit acts of piracy arise from a variety of 
interrelated variables, including weak local government authority, 
particular geographical characteristics and the weak implementation of 
international maritime regimes or standards of state behaviour.  
Piracy flourishes in areas with weak government authority. The lack 
of government authority often coincides with underfunded law 
enforcement agencies, such as police forces and coastal guards, which lack 
the necessary equipment and personnel to carry out their duties and are 
thus induced to corruption more quickly. Naval law enforcement is 
expensive and consists of radars, boats, command and control centres, as 
well as well-paid (and, therefore, less prone to corruption) personnel with 
knowledge of the local area. This is usually outside the budget of affected 
countries. Limited funding for law enforcement agencies leads to high 
levels of corruption, a typical characteristic of weak and fragile states. In 
places where government authority has ceased to exist, predation and 
lawlessness form the foundation for pirates to organise and engage in 
attacks. Such areas, which are in the dominion of failed states, are also 
called ungoverned territories or ‘black holes’. Areas can turn into ‘black 
holes’ during military conflict (e.g., Lebanon, 1975) or after a military 
58 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
conflict from which no single victory has emerged (e.g. Somalia, after 
1991).22 Therefore, weak local government authority is a key determinant of 
piracy. It is often closely correlated with underlying factors such as bad 
governance, and lack of economic development. Lack of authority, 
capability and political will to combat and prosecute pirates can lead to a 
further breakdown of its already weak state structures. 
Pirate attacks usually take place close to coasts or in narrow seas. The 
vicinity of coasts provides pirates with a safe haven to which to escape after 
an attack. Pirates prefer to attack vessels sailing through narrow seas, since 
vessels often reduce speed when transiting through such maritime 
chokepoints. Such chokepoints therefore provide excellent ‘hunting 
grounds’ for pirates. However, international waters also provide latitude 
for pirates. Shipping companies are better insured in these waters and are 
therefore more inclined to pay a ransom. This means that every sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) used for trade, logistics and naval forces could 
become vulnerable. 
Capability 
The capability of pirates to attack vessels is a function of the technology, 
arms and pre-established logistical infrastructure they have at their 
disposal. Faster vessels and more lethal weaponry allow pirates to wage 
attacks farther from coastlines on a wider variety of vessels. The 
proliferation of arms and technology after the end of the Cold War, which 
boosted the black arms market, has tremendously enhanced the capabilities 
of pirates. Where in the past pirates used knives and guns, today, according 
to Noel Choong, a director at the IMB, “they come equipped with AK-47s, 
M-16s, and rocket-propelled grenades.”23 This is leading to an increased 
awareness amongst policy-makers, authorities, insurers and sea farers to 
combat this threat.24 
 
                                                     
22 R. Korteweg (2008), “Black Holes: On Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental 
Weaknesses”, Civil Wars, Vol. 10, No. 1, March, pp. 60-71. 
23 See http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/09/piracy-logistics-shipping-biz-
logistics-cx_wp_0610piracy.html. 
24 P. Chalk, international security analyst at RAND, 
http://www.maritimesecurityagency.com/blog/?p=101 
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Target 
The type of target chosen by pirates depends on the opportunities and 
capabilities of the pirates, as well as to what extent target ships are actually 
‘suited’ to attack. The majority of the vessels under attack are the ships 
above 10,000 Grosse Registered Tonnage (GRT) such as general cargo 
vessels, container ships, chemical and production tankers as well as oil 
tankers.  
The extent to which ships use technology and protection against 
piracy varies significantly and with this the chance to fall victim to an 
attack. Piracy can be prevented via surveillance mechanisms and through 
actively detecting pirates early and fending them off with non-lethal 
means.  
The majority of pirates are ultimately driven by profit motives.25 
Piracy will be around as long as there are profits to be made in the piracy 
business. The vast majority of piracy attacks are committed by petty thieves 
who often operate along clan or family lines. More professionalised 
organisations kidnap crews for ransom or steal the commodities 
transported by the vessels, and in some cases even hijack the entire vessel. 
They have a great and growing number of high value targets due to a 
massive increase in commercial maritime traffic over the years. While the 
value range varies significantly, it is estimated that as of 2008 pirates 
pocketed an average of $10,000 per attack for a classic armed robbery 
attack, but it is reasonable to assume this amount has perhaps doubled in 
the current piracy climate.26 However, the going rate for ransom payments 
ranges between $600,000 USD to as much as $5.0 million USD.27 A dramatic 
example was the seizure of the Ukrainian ship MV Faina in September 2008 
- carrying 33 T-72 tanks and other military equipment - for which a ransom 
of $20 million USD was demanded.28 Profit rather than poverty is the driver 
                                                     
25 Some maritime security analysts dispute the existence of an ideological nexus 
between pirates and terrorists. Eric Frecon (2007), see http://www.recaap.org/ 
news/pdf/news/sep07_tackle_piracy.pdf. 
26 P. Chalk (2008), The Maritime Dimension of International Security – terrorism, piracy, 
and challenges to the United States, Project Air Force, RAND. 
27 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm. 
28 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7674268.stm. After several months of 
negotiations, the pirates eventually settled with a payment of around $3.2 million. 
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of piracy, although poverty produces a larger pool of willing recruits. This 
happened in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, for 
example, when severe political instability and massive unemployment 
induced poor workers to seek illegal means. Piracy opportunity and 
profitability are not only enhanced by an increase in the size of world trade 
transported by sea, it is also influenced by the increased willingness of 
companies and insurers to pay ransom for their crews and the tradability of 
stolen commodities.  
Conclusion 
To date, contemporary piracy has resulted in only temporary ceasing or re-
routing shipping trade flows. However, increased costs due to piracy could 
act as a non-tariff barrier to trade, because the costs of using dangerous 
ports can be sufficiently high so that ship owners are dissuaded from 
shipping cargo there, which in effect creates a type of boycott.29 Value 
losses should also include the indirect economic costs that piracy poses. 
This explains why as of October 2008 the European Union, followed by 
NATO, set up a costly anti-piracy military operation off the coast of 
Somalia.  
However, the fight against piracy only by political means will not 
suffice. The need for security remains readily available for shipping 
companies. Seafarers themselves will have to develop initiatives for greater 
security. The use of ‘private military companies’ might be ineffective in the 
long run as it can reinforce the cycle of violence and endanger the safety of 
the crew.  
In conclusion, the following factors will influence the future 
development of piracy:  
• The number of areas characterised by weak governmental authority, 
with underfunded law enforcement agencies or no law enforcement 
agencies at all (so-called ‘black holes’); 
• The choice of sea routes by vessels as piracy attacks predominantly 
take place along coasts or in narrow seas that are currently navigated 
by commercial vessels. Re-routing of SLOC is only likely to happen if 
piracy attacks keep increasing in maritime chokepoints; 
                                                     
29 D. Dillon (2000), Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade, Heritage 
Foundation. 
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• The proliferation of modern arms and technology in enhancing the 
capacity of pirates;  
• The extent to which organised criminal syndicates will concentrate on 
piracy as a source of income in the future (opposed to the present 
where attacks are still predominantly waged by petty thieves). 
• The profitability of piracy, which is partly a function of the size of 
world trade and the seas as major hub of transportation of world 
trade (currently 80% of world trade is transported over seas); 
• The willingness of a leading state or group of states to tackle piracy is 
crucial for the effectiveness of international regimes and their 
implementation;  
• Protection and safety measures implemented by ports and ships; and 
• The extent to which states will value traditional security concerns and 
hold on to traditional prerogatives – i.e. national sovereignty in 
territorial waters – or whether they will allow other states’ patrol 
vessels to enter their coastal zones to deal with the non-state threat of 
piracy. 
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Somali Based Piracy: 
Operations in a Legal Context 
Steven Haines* 
awyers like definitions. Indeed, they are vital, not least in criminal 
law. Activities are lawful when they are not proscribed; those 
forbidden by law are crimes. In most instances, a crime is only so if it 
is expressly defined as such in statute law, with perhaps a very thin 
dividing line between lawful behaviour and criminal activity. Tax evasion 
is a crime; tax avoidance is not. As a very well-known former British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer reputedly remarked, the only difference 
between the two is the thickness of a prison wall.1 Definitions are fairly 
important. 
Nevertheless, one of the difficulties lawyers frequently have to face is 
that definitions are often inadequate. Important activities either 
inconveniently fall outside the definition – or equally inconveniently fall 
within. Also problematic is the tendency for us to think we know what we 
mean by a word describing a particular phenomenon – until we try to 
define it, when difficulties (even absurdities) can arise. ‘Terrorism’ for 
example: we instinctively know what this is but all attempts so far to define 
it adequately in international law have failed. In contrast, ‘genocide’ is 
something that has certainly been defined but which, bizarrely, fails 
indisputably to include either the massacres that occurred in Cambodia 
under the Pol Pot regime or the humanitarian abuses that have been meted 
out to the people of Darfur since 2003. We must beware definitions. 
‘Piracy’ is like genocide in that it is rather precisely defined in 
contemporary international law. Indeed, its universally agreed definition, 
coupled with the notion of universal jurisdiction attached to it, means that 
the international law relating to piracy is very easily described and prima 
facie unproblematic. Pirates have been a constant feature of the maritime 
                                                     
* Head of the Security and Law Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy. 
1 This comment is attributed to Denis (now Lord) Healy. 
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scene throughout modern history and piracy was the first significant 
activity to be regarded as a crime under international law. It was piracy 
that first gave rise to the notion of universal jurisdiction.  
Although the law of sea piracy has developed over centuries, for our 
purposes today we can rely on the definition that emerged during the 20th 
century, from the work of the Harvard Research Group in the 1930s and the 
follow-on work of the International Law Commission in the 1950s, prior to 
the negotiations that produced the 1958 High Seas Convention.2 The 1958 
definition was repeated in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Article 101 of which defines piracy as the: 
‘committing of any of the following acts: 
1. Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft; or 
against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state; 
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with the knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; 
3. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this 
Article.’ 
In brief, piracy is committed on the high seas, involves two ships (one 
committing the act; the other the victim), and is intended for private gain. 
So we know what piracy is, but this precise definition has in the past 
proved problematic.  
No relatively recent event has focused attention on the shortcomings 
of the legal definition of piracy as much as the hijacking of the Italian cruise 
ship, the Achille Lauro, in late 1985. The vessel was cruising in the eastern 
Mediterranean and was due to stop in both Arab and Israeli ports. 
                                                     
2 B.H. Dubner (1980), The Law of International Sea Pirac, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, p. 3. 
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Embarked, masquerading as holidaymakers, was a group of Palestinian 
terrorists. While off the Egyptian coast, they seized the ship. During the 
hijacking they murdered an elderly American Jewish passenger confined to 
a wheelchair and threw him over the side into the waters of the 
Mediterranean.  
This incident, played out over several days, gripped the world’s 
media, and caused many to accuse the hijackers of piracy. In fact it was 
nothing of the sort. As passengers, the hijackers were mutineers not pirates. 
Nor were they motivated by private gain. If the hijacking had been piracy, 
universal jurisdiction would have applied. Since it was not, jurisdictional 
issues became a cause of controversy. In the wake of the hijacking, the 
International Maritime Bureau examined the issues3 and contributed to a 
process that resulted in the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against Merchant Shipping (subsequently referred to as the 
SUA Convention).4  
A further issue of consideration in the Achille Lauro case was the 
location of the hijacking: did it take place on the high seas or within 
Egyptian territorial limits? The high seas are the areas of ocean beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of coastal states. Traditionally, they commenced at 
the generally accepted distance of three nautical miles from the coast. Since 
the late 1950s, however, the outer limit of territorial jurisdiction has shifted 
and, certainly since the coming into force of the 1982 UN Convention, is 
now set at 12 nautical miles from the coast. Three nautical miles is well 
within visible distance of the shore. Twelve nautical miles is beyond the 
visible horizon of an observer positioned on the beach – at sea level. 
Significantly, the extension of territorial jurisdiction has effectively 
excluded the bulk of previously piratical acts from the modern definition. 
                                                     
3 Shortly after the hijacking, the International Maritime Bureau convened a 
workshop in San Jose, California to ‘brainstorm’ the problem. The present author 
was one of the participants in that 1986 workshop, the results of which were 
published as: B.A.H. Parritt (ed.), Violence at Sea, Paris, International Chamber of 
Commerce, 1986. The report was submitted to the Maritime Safety Committee of 
the International Maritime Organization and informed the subsequent drafting of 
what became the 1988 SUA Convention. 
4 Following an updating protocol of 2005, the convention is now to be referred to as 
the 2005 SUA Convention (Article 15(2) of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA 
Convention). 
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Most such acts are committed within 12 nautical miles of the coast and are 
not piracy in international law but breaches of the criminal law of the 
coastal state. In enforcement terms, a substantial proportion of piratical acts 
committed in recent years have, therefore, been the responsibility of coastal 
states, be they in the South China Sea, the Singapore and Malacca Straits or 
off the west coast of Africa.  
In the past, the governments of major maritime powers, and 
especially those that combined significant merchant marines with navies 
capable of operating beyond their immediate region, have been criticised 
for failing to suppress piracy. In the UK, for example, questions have 
frequently been posed by those working in the commercial shipping sector 
about the Royal Navy’s lack of action in the face of persistent piracy related 
problems. One can discern three principal reasons why governments in the 
past often took no significant action to suppress piratical acts prior to the 
onset of Somali related piracy. 
The first of these falls out of the comments made above about coastal 
piracy. The simple fact is that, with most piratical acts occurring within 
territorial limits, navies of other than the relevant coastal state have been 
legally constrained from taking any effective action. Warships are not able 
to act in such ways within territorial limits without the agreement of the 
relevant coastal states.  
Second, navies have not previously been engaged in significant 
counter-piracy operations because the consequences of them not being 
employed to suppress it have been marginal. Although many accounts of 
piratical action against merchant vessels include stories of violent threats 
and intimidation, financially piracy has not been on a scale to drive 
government policy, even in states with major shipping interests. The 
financial costs and consequences of piracy simply have not justified major 
naval deployments in response. 
A third reason why the governments of maritime powers have not 
reacted to the long standing scourge of piracy, is that it has largely been out 
of the consciousness of members of the general public. Whether we like it 
or not, even in a supposed maritime nation like the UK, members of the 
public are not especially concerned by issues that fall well beyond them or 
that affect their own lives. Government priorities are frequently driven 
more by the needs of those who vote for those in power, than they are by 
real world problems beyond the borders of the state. It takes something 
quite extraordinary to provoke a government to take action in the face of 
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events occurring beyond the sight or day to day concern of those who will 
ultimately pay – the taxpaying voters. 
The international reaction to Somali-based piracy has been motivated 
by a set of circumstances in which all three of the above reasons for past 
inaction have been absent. First, Somali pirates are operating on the high 
seas. Indeed, some of the vessel seizures have occurred hundreds of miles 
out into the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, well beyond the territorial 
limits of coastal states in the region.5 From a practical, operational, point of 
view the offences have been well within sea areas in which navies can 
legitimately operate without first obtaining the agreement of coastal states. 
Second, the financial consequences have been substantially higher than 
those arising from the normal run of piratical activity. The vessels seized 
have included very large merchant vessels with valuable cargoes and the 
ransoms paid out to secure the release of the ships and their crews have 
often run into millions – whether GB pounds, US dollars or euro.6 Given 
the timeframes necessary to negotiate the release of vessels and crews (2 to 
3 months) the costs are also significantly increased by the actual ship days 
lost to the shipping companies. Finally, the scale of Somali based piracy, 
including the seizure of several large vessels, has attracted significant 
international media attention in the last 12 months and this has given it a 
profile sufficient to warrant an international political response.  
Interestingly, though, while the value of the vessels and their cargoes 
and the safety of crew members have prompted ransom payments in the 
millions of pounds, and while media attention has forced the problem onto 
the agendas of several governments, the consequences have not been 
sufficient to provoke significant action against the root cause of Somali 
piracy – the situation ashore in Somalia. This would involve the serious 
                                                     
5 As recently as 11 November 2009, for example, pirates hijacked a bulk carrier 
with 22 crewmembers onboard in a position in the Indian Ocean over 1000 nautical 
miles southeast of Mogadishu (information obtained from the IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre, Live Piracy Report). 
6 The Liberian registered (but Saudi owned) very large crude carrier (VLCC) Sirius 
Star was hijacked on 15 November 2008; it was the largest vessel to be seized to 
date and prompted a burst of media attention. The vessel itself was worth $150M 
and had a cargo of crude oil valued at $100M. Although the pirates originally 
demanded a ransom of $25M, they were in fact only paid 3 million, some of which 
was lost when five hijackers drowned as their boat capsized. 
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prospect of intervention in Somalia itself in an attempt to stabilise the 
territory and establish a reasonable level of security and good governance. 
No major power (e.g. the US or Britain), let alone the organisations to 
which they belong (e.g. NATO and the European Union) – have either any 
desire or free capacity to engage in that way. Conveniently, however, the 
absence of a legal constraint on naval action in this case has provided a way 
for governments to at least appear to be doing something significant in 
response – and their navies, anxious to demonstrate their own utility in a 
contemporary security context that has not played to their strengths, have 
leapt to the fore. Anti-piracy operations have also provided the EU, keen to 
establish its military credentials, with an ideal opportunity so to do. It has 
seized that opportunity with alacrity. 
It has been this arguably unique combination of legal, operational 
and political conditions that has resulted in the remarkable concentration of 
naval forces in the region. US and European naval forces have been joined 
by a plethora of other units from a diverse (and seemingly unlikely) range 
of states: Russia, Malaysia, Japan, India – even China, beginning to flex its 
maritime muscles. Remarkable indeed – and one senses great power 
opportunism here as China puts down a marker with its surging naval 
capacity and keen interest in increasing its influence, in Africa in particular. 
The naval forces gathered in the region are organised under various 
task forces and are employed on three different but overlapping tasks. 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 together with Operation Atalanta (the EU 
operation run from Northwood in London) and Operation Open Shield 
(NATO) are formally constituted groupings of forces. Other vessels also 
operate in the region, the whole effort benefiting from a range of 
coordination, command and control, intelligence and information exchange 
arrangements. The different tasks consist of: the provision of security for 
World Food Programme vessels supplying Somalia; the protection of 
maritime traffic on passage through the Gulf of Aden; and the maintenance 
of a maritime presence in the Indian Ocean between Africa and the 
Seychelles. Despite the element of deterrent effect this gathering of naval 
forces is arguably providing, from an operational point of view it is 
extremely difficult to cover the area of ocean affected by piracy and to 
provide effective security for ships in transit. There are over 20,000 ship 
movements annually through the Gulf of Aden (GOA) alone, for example. 
This is far too many to convoy. The pragmatic solution to the security of 
their passage has been the establishment of an internationally 
recommended transit corridor (IRTC) that concentrates both east and west 
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bound vulnerable shipping in the high threat area within the hours of 
darkness and under the cover of naval presence. World Food Programme 
vessels are individually escorted. The most vulnerable vessels now are 
those in the Indian Ocean as far as 1,000 nautical miles from the African 
coast. It is impossible for naval forces to patrol that entire area and provide 
close cover to vessels on passage through it. The naval presence in the 
GOA, the effective establishment of the IRTC and the escorting of World 
Food Programme vessels have caused a shift in pirate activity to the more 
distant areas. 
Despite the difficulties, we are witness to a concerted effort at sea to 
stem the rise in piracy in a manner fully consistent with the relevant 
international law. Even problems to do with the legitimate continuation of 
international maritime operations within the territorial waters off Somalia 
have been covered. Any pirate vessels being pursued on the high seas are 
potentially free from interdiction as soon as they enter territorial limits; 
there is no right of hot pursuit into territorial waters and warships are 
obliged to let them proceed. This requirement has, however, been waived 
by UN Security Council action, coupled with Somali consent to 
international anti-piracy operations continuing in their waters.7 
International law ‘works’ to enable operations off Somalia because this 
particular brand of piracy fits neatly into the legal definition and Somalia 
itself is cooperating to allow its suppression in its waters. 
But this is not the end of the legal dimension. Universal jurisdiction 
means that the flag state of any warship apprehending pirates can, in 
theory, prosecute them for their crimes. One says ‘in theory’ because this is 
easier said than done. The practical difficulties associated with the transfer 
of apprehended pirates into the criminal jurisdictions of the warships’ flag 
states, including the timelines involved, are mildly problematic. There is 
only any point in such transfers if the apprehending state is able to bring 
criminal prosecutions within their jurisdictions. While universal 
jurisdiction exists at the international level, at the municipal, or domestic, 
law level its application cannot be assumed. The criminal codes of the 
states deploying naval forces to the region cover this issue in different 
                                                     
7 There have been seven UNSC resolutions since 2007, all passed under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter: 1772(2007); 1801(2008); 1814(2008); 1816(2008); 1838(2008); 
1846(2008); and 1851(2008). The last of these expires in December 2009 and it will 
require a further resolution to extend its provisions. 
SOMALIA AND THE PIRATES | 69 
ways. Some can prosecute piracy, while others do not have the law in place 
to allow them to do so. There is also the vital issue of the quality and 
amount of evidence necessary to achieve a successful prosecution.  
Interestingly, however, while much has been said about piracy and 
universal jurisdiction, the activities of pirates for the most part actually fall 
into other categories of criminally defined activity. One solution to the 
difficulties associated with prosecuting for piracy is, therefore, to find an 
alternative means of bringing criminal charges against those involved. The 
solution in many cases may well be to employ the 2005 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA) rather than to prosecute for piracy as such. Fortunately, in the case 
of Somali piracy, all of the incidents that have occurred so far seem to be 
consistent with such an approach. Other international conventions of 
relevance and applicability include the 1979 International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages and the 2000 United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime. State parties to these three 
conventions should have enabling domestic legislation in place to give 
effect to their provisions. Instead of prosecuting for piracy, the obvious 
way to proceed is to use that legislation as a basis for prosecution.  
In relation to jurisdiction, there are essentially four prosecution 
options. The first is for apprehending warships to transfer those charged 
with piracy to courts in their own state. Some have indeed done this, with 
pirates finding themselves in Europe and the US for prosecution. A second 
option is to land pirates to Somalia and Puntland for prosecution – the 
territory from which they operate. Given the political and administrative 
circumstances ashore there, this has not been a seriously likely option so 
far. A third option is to land those apprehended to another state in the 
region for prosecution. This is the most strongly favoured option and 
agreements were reached in late 2008 and early 2009 to transfer detainees 
to Kenyan jurisdiction for process. Although convenient, this is not ideal, 
and Kenya has not yet proved to be an efficient solution to the problem. A 
final option might be to set up a special court in the region to prosecute 
pirates. While this might sound an appropriate way forward, it is not 
favoured by the interested parties to date. Apart from the fact that it is not 
necessary, the creation of another international tribunal for this specific 
purpose would most likely prove to be an expensive and overly 
bureaucratic solution. The already established International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is not an option because the crime of piracy does not fall within its 
jurisdiction and it is most unlikely that the Rome Statute of the Court could 
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now be modified to include it without extensive re-negotiation. For the 
moment, therefore, the Kenyan option is the most attractive.  
Somali piracy hit the world’s headlines in late 2008 in particular, 
largely as a result of the seizure of the Sirius Star, a VLCC with a full cargo 
of crude oil. This seizure acted as a catalyst for what followed. A 
substantial naval presence in the region is dealing as far as it can with the 
problem in a legal situation that, while to a degree problematic at the level 
of prosecution, is by no means acting as a serious constraint. The operations 
currently being conducted are, however, focusing on the symptom of 
piracy without dealing to any significant degree with its underlying cause. 
This is, undoubtedly, the situation within Somalia itself. Until that is dealt 
with, the problem is unlikely to go away.  
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Somali Terrorism and Piracy  
(A ‘lesser-included case’) 
Jonathan Stevenson* 
he chronic governance and security problems in Somalia began in 
1991, when strongman President Mohammed Siad Barre was 
overthrown in a civil war. Competing clans then commandeered 
weapons supplied to his government, alternately by the Soviets and the 
Americans during the Cold War, and the country devolved into a 
Darwinian patchwork of armed clan fiefdoms with no central authority. 
Then came a famine that an ineffectual United Nations mission was unable 
to address, prompting the United States to lead an international military 
intervention in December 1992, with the relatively narrow intention of 
facilitating humanitarian relief, though in the grander service of a “new 
world order.”1  
In bootstrapping a humanitarian mission into coercive peace 
enforcement, however, the US angered Somali clan militias. Their fury 
culminated in the infamous October 1993 “Black Hawk Down” 
confrontation in which 18 US Army Rangers and hundreds of Somalis 
died.2 This disaster spurred a hurried American withdrawal, stoked anti-
Americanism, and strengthened al-Qaeda’s hand in East Africa. Osama bin 
Laden and second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri have cast the US as a 
“paper tiger” with no staying power, and their favourite examples include 
American pullouts from Lebanon after Hezbollah’s 1983 barracks bombing 
and from Somalia after “Black Hawk Down.” 
                                                     
* US Naval War College, Newport, RI. 
1 See John L. Hirsch & Robert Oakley (1995), Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: 
Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press; Jonathan Stevenson (1995), Losing Mogadishu: Testing US 
Policy in Somalia, Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press. 
2 See Mark Bowden (1999), Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press,. 
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Threat perceptions and realities 
Since 1991, some 14 governments formed in exile have tried and failed to 
govern, though the latest one – the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
– remains intact. From the mid-1990s, Somalia has been viewed as a 
potential exporter of Islamist terrorism. Western threat perceptions have 
been high since the 11 September attacks, and especially since the defeat of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001. The standing fear has been that al-
Qaeda holdouts fleeing Central Asia would reconstitute their operational 
base in weak states in the Gulf or sub-Saharan Africa. Pakistan’s utility as 
an alternative base for al-Qaeda moderated these fears, but recent counter-
terrorism successes there have revived them. Yemen is the leading 
candidate for such jihadist migration. Somalia, however, appears to be a 
fairly close second given its homogeneous Sunni Muslim population, 
absence of state enforcement mechanisms, incrementally rising militant 
Islamism and proximity to the Persian Gulf.3 
Islamist elements in Somalia have helped propagate terrorism. The 
explosives used in the December 2002 attack on Israeli tourists in 
Mombasa, Kenya probably came from Somalia, and perpetrators of that 
attack and the nearly simultaneous attempted shoot-down of an Israeli 
airliner leaving Mombasa used Somalia as a bolt-hole. A number of Somalis 
reportedly went to Lebanon to help Hizbullah battle Israeli forces in the 
2006 ‘summer war’ in exchange for military training. The Somali diaspora 
is large and widespread, and repatriates up to $700 million a year through 
hard-to-monitor hawala remittance vehicles. Thus, the diaspora is a 
potential terrorist support network and recruiting pool, especially if their 
host nations and allies are seen as harming their country and countrymen.  
The al-Qaeda-linked militant Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab (“the 
youth”) has transnational ambitions, aiming to create a fundamentalist 
Islamist state across the Horn of Africa. The group's core leadership sprang 
from a nucleus of hardline Somali militants working with al-Ittihaad al-
Islamia (AIAI) – a Somalia-based group headed by Sheik Hassan Dahir 
Aweys that provided protection and support (e.g., training camps) for al-
Qaeda's East Africa cell, but was decimated as a result of popular hostility 
and, reportedly, raids by Ethiopian troops in the mid- to late 1990s. Al-
                                                     
3 See Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger (2009), “Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for 
Somalia and Yemen, New York Times, 11 June. 
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Shabaab eventually broke from the AIAI leadership, began ‘manhunting’ 
operations against secular warlords supporting Western counterterrorism 
efforts, and targeted international aid workers and peace activists. The 
organisation, though relatively flat with loose command-and-control, then 
became the elite fighting force of the ICU, and now constitutes the main 
element of the anti-TFG insurgency. To this point, the group's most 
devastating attacks occurred in the relatively peaceful northern areas of 
Somaliland and Puntland in October 2008. Five coordinated explosions at 
local government offices, a UN compound, and the Ethiopian consulate 
reflected considerable sophistication and reach. As of late 2008, al-Shabaab 
was the dominant political entity in southern Somalia, imposing an 
especially intolerant version of sharia as well as using sheer force.4  
Al-Shabaab’s recruiting reach extends to the Somali diaspora in 
North America, Europe, and Australia. Shirwa Ahmed, one of about 20 
ethnic Somalis recruited from the US and trained by al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
perpetrated the first terrorist suicide attack by an American in one of the 
October 2008 operations in Somaliland.5 In November 2009, the US 
Attorney’s office in Minneapolis announced that 14 Somali-Americans had 
been indicted on federal terrorism-related charges. The other major armed 
Islamist group is Hizbul Islam, which is headed by Aweys, maintains a 
more geographically confined nationalistic focus, and is considered by 
many to be primarily Aweys’ vehicle for his eventual leadership of an 
Islamic Somali state. Eritrea has supported and continues to support Somali 
Islamists as proxies against its arch-enemy Ethiopia, with an eye to bogging 
it down in Somalia. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have provided training 
camps for al-Qaeda as well as a safe haven for a number of its higher-
ranking East Africa operatives. Two of them – Abu Talha al-Sudani by the 
Ethiopians in 2007 and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan by US special-operations 
forces this past September – have been killed in Somalia. Yet despite their 
synergistic political and operational relationship, al-Shabaab has not 
formally merged with al-Qaeda, and has been compromised by internal 
                                                     
4 See A. Le Sage (2009), “Militias and Insurgency in Somalia”, Policy Watch, No. 
1593, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 October 
(www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3131). 
5 See J. Straziuso & A. O. Selsky (2009), “Somali Training Camps Fuel Threat of 
Attacks on US”, Associated Press, 29 November. 
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personal and political rivalries. Thus, Somalia has not, so far, ripened into a 
fully-fledged global terrorist threat.6 
The pirate factor 
While jihadism in Somalia has been contained, Somali piracy has increased 
Somalia’s threat to international security. Over the last two years Somali 
pirates, estimated to number over 1,000 and gaining recruits, enabled by 
the absence of the rule of law on the ground, have staged increasingly 
frequent and brazen attacks on commercial vessels transporting vital cargo 
such as oil, food and weapons in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Aden. They pose at least a strategic nuisance. US Navy maritime surface 
and air assets assigned to US Central Command and constituting the main 
elements of Combined Task Force 151, patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean, have conducted anti-piracy operations in coordination with 
NATO’s Operation Open Shield, the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, 
and navies of other nations (including China, India, Japan, Malaysia, 
Turkey, and Russia) commercially affected by Somali piracy. Despite 
several dramatic and successful interdictions – in spring 2009, for instance, 
the US Navy rescued the captain of the US-flagged Maersk Alabama, killing 
three of the Somali pirates holding him hostage – even modern blue-water 
navies cannot identify and target all of the small pirate vessels operating in 
vast expanses of water. Thus, the deterrent effect of this surge has been 
ambiguous at best.  
Up until October 2009, Somali pirate attacks numbered 178 – more 
than the total of 111 for all of 2008. Their boldness and geographical 
adaptability do not appear to have subsided. Earlier this month, they used 
rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons to attempt to capture a 
Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker 400 nautical miles northeast of the Seychelles 
Islands – the farthest out they are known to have operated. An EU spotter 
plane was sent to find the pirates, but its efforts were unavailing.  
The United States’ recent addition of Seychelles-based high-altitude, 
high-speed Reaper drone – with a 14-hour-plus loitering capability and a 
range of 3,000 nautical miles – will increase the surveillance coverage of the 
                                                     
6 See A. Le Sage (2009), “Peacebuilding and Terrorism: Fragile Gains in Somalia”, 
Policy Watch, No. 1594, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 October 2009 
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counter-piracy effort.7 But most naval commanders do not consider the 
containment of the piracy problem a central military task, seeing it as a 
distraction from core counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, deterrence, 
and war fighting missions, and in any case difficult to accomplish in 
practice. While Somali piracy has made a non-trivial impact on maritime 
trade between East Africa and Asia, and could affect strategic cargos like 
oil and weapons, to a significant extent the international community has 
thus far relied on the private sector – through better security training for 
crews, shipboard countermeasures, and higher insurance rates – to regulate 
rather than eliminate the phenomenon. Accordingly, Somali piracy may not 
appreciably diminish until Somalia’s ground-based security problems are 
improved.  
Major-power calculations 
In light of external actors’ political and military futility in dealing with 
Somalia, the US State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, according to 
an internal report circulated in August 2009, rates Somalia “the hottest of 
many policy fires burning” in Africa. The demands of Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Iran, as well as arguably more urgent needs within Africa in Sudan 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, will divert the major powers’ 
attention from Somalia and make supporting a major United Nations or 
African Union peacekeeping effort prohibitively difficult. But bringing 
greater order and control to the Somali polity is a high regional priority on 
account of its potential as a jihadist safe haven and operational base, as well 
as the impact that burgeoning Somali piracy is having on global commerce.  
Given Islamist terrorists’ effective use of maritime operations in the 
November 2008 Mumbai attacks and the prevalence of sea transport – licit 
and illicit – of military hardware and WMD-related technology by sea, 
possible synergies between Islamist terrorists and pirates also need to be 
considered. The threat appears to be real, as there are extant tactical 
relationships between pirates and Islamist militants. At the same time, 
these links appear to be essentially mercenary rather than political or 
ideological. Furthermore, piracy has flourished mainly in the less unruly 
northern part of Somalia – especially self-proclaimed, secularly run 
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Puntland, on the Horn – and not in the anarchical south that al-Shabaab 
dominates.8 Accordingly, Somali piracy is hardly of a piece with Somali 
jihadist terrorism, and consequently is unlikely to attract as much durable 
strategic attention from major powers as Somalia’s ground-based problems 
in any case. Rather, they will tend to treat piracy as a ‘lesser-included case’ 
of anarchy-driven insecurity. 
A narrow counter-terrorism approach to that insecurity, consisting of 
military containment plus covert support to pro-Western Somali groups 
and regional powers, has not worked.9 Ethiopia’s expeditious US-backed 
suppression in 2006-07 of the grassroots Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which 
held sway in Somalia for six months, and support of the internationally 
recognised TFG damped down the terrorist threat in the short term. But in 
early 2009 Ethiopia substantially withdrew its forces, which had alienated 
and enraged Somalis through brutal tactics. US targeted killing strikes from 
AC-130 gunships and Navy vessels that produced civilian casualties, 
though undeniable short-term operational blows to jihadism in the region, 
have tended to intensify anti-American attitudes and terrorist impulses 
among Somalis in the longer term.10 
Seemingly in direct relation to various forms of Western intervention, 
Islamist militants in Somalia have grown in number, probably by an order 
of magnitude, and resurged accordingly. Loosely estimated at between 
5,000 and 10,000, they now control most of the territory in southern 
Somalia, though TFG and the AU-sponsored African Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) forces have managed to keep the capital city, Mogadishu, out of 
their hands. In summer 2009, Ethiopia dispatched perhaps hundreds of 
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troops, reportedly with tacit US approval, to thwart Islamist takeovers of 
Somali towns near the Ethiopian border – in particular, Beledweyne, which 
in August 2009 had been overrun by militiamen of Hizbul Islam – but 
denied any intent to re-occupy the country.  
Somalia still epitomises the failed state. The TFG has not collected 
taxes or provided effective social services, established a sound civilian law 
enforcement organisation enjoying anything like a monopoly on the use of 
force, or been able to make collective decisions for the populace. Without 
substantial political advances, even at its full strength of 8,000 troops, 
AMISOM forces would have no realistic chance of controlling a 
factionalised, heavily armed, Somali population. The current deployment, 
about 5,000 Ugandan and Burundian soldiers, has improved its efforts to 
protect the TFG and in September 2009 was given a more muscular 
mandate for peace enforcement, but it remains too small and under-
equipped to be truly effective.  
The UN, the United States, the EU, the International Contact Group 
on Somalia,* and Djibouti have worked hard – though inconspicuously – to 
facilitate two changes in the TFG. In January 2009, the TFG parliament was 
expanded from 275 to 550 members to realise more equitable clan 
representation and, crucially, to accommodate moderate Islamist parties. 
Less than a week after the parliamentary reform was approved, Sharif 
Sheik Ahmed – a relatively moderate Islamist – won the January 2009 
presidential election. As a member of one of the two critical Hawiye 
subclans that dominate Mogadishu, he stands a chance of resolving 
conflicts with the other, and appears willing to try. Furthermore, Sheik 
Sharif, former head of the ICU, has substantial credibility with the Islamic 
community.11 
Which is the most plausible pathway to political rehabilitation, 
however, is still unclear. The intuitively attractive ‘building block’ 
approach – whereby self-declared Somali entities (Somaliland in the north, 
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Puntland in the central region) are politically and economically induced to 
improve governance and then confederate – seems utopian. It is very 
unlikely that any governable entities to the south, encompassing 
Mogadishu and Kismayu, where al-Shabaab is based, would coalesce. 
Politically recognising Somali statelets could set a troublesome 
international precedent. A unitary state would square with the preferences 
of the UN, the US, and Europe, as well as the ‘one Somalia’ policy of 
neighbouring countries like Djibouti and Kenya, which regard a unified 
Somalia as the natural geopolitical balancer against Ethiopia and as less 
susceptible to destabilising mischief by Eritrea, the local geopolitical 
spoiler.  
The US and other external actors appear to be adopting a less bold 
but more realistic approach. Sheik Sharif is being given time to consolidate 
his presidential authority, if necessary by using force against rival militias 
in the south. The idea is that if he is able to marginalise them, bring relative 
order to southern Somalia, and perhaps even pull together a national multi-
clan militia, Somaliland and Puntland may warm to reconstituting a 
unitary state from the top down. Limited operational and tactical 
engagement by US and coalition partners – for instance, on counter-piracy 
matters – with Somaliland and Puntland, would tacitly acknowledge their 
status as functionally discrete political entities and perhaps encourage their 
leaders to compromise and reconcile. With this sort of remedy, anti-piracy 
and conflict-resolution efforts would converge.  
The idea may be gaining traction. In October 2009, the Norwegian 
Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NBIR) published a 71-page 
report entitled “Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception 
and Remedies” arguing that helping cooperative groups with some local 
legitimacy and power could be more effective. These would include the 
Puntland authorities and the central Somalia-based Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna 
wal Jamaa, which opposes the radical and militant interpretations of Islam 
espoused by al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. Noting that the international naval 
coalition “is simply too small to cover the whole area” affected by piracy, 
“lacked any mechanism to address the onshore causes of piracy,” and 
offered Somalis themselves no ownership of the anti-piracy campaign, the 
NBIR recommended paying and training existing forces to fight piracy, 
establishing a separate Somali entity with a good measure of operational 
autonomy, or hiring private military companies to interdict piracy on-shore 
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instead of offshore.12 An even more ambitious EU plan was mooted in 
April. In Djibouti, where both France and the US have military ground 
presences, the French army would train a small corps of about 500 Somalis, 
which would in turn train 5,000 more Somalis (perhaps drawn 
substantially from the Puntland authorities and Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa) to 
function as an official ‘coast guard’ – part of a larger, 15,000-strong EU-
trained and funded Somali security apparatus – to fight and deter pirates 
on land. The German government supported the plan in principle, but also 
voiced understandable worries that EU money and weapons might wind 
up in the hands of pirate or other destabilising groups, and that the trainees 
themselves could join such groups.13 
Prospects 
While policy-makers in Washington and Europe appear increasingly aware 
of the inadequacy of the putative narrow counter-terrorism approach, they 
are also sceptical of any full-blown state-building efforts that might 
complement or replace it. The fluid and fragile nature of Somali alliances, 
and the tenuousness of public support for Islamist and secular groups 
alike, have also suggested that inflexibly backing one faction could 
ultimately prove fruitless. Indeed, the expanded Somali parliament, while 
structurally more equitable, may prove too unwieldy to make a substantive 
difference.  
Nevertheless, the US, UN, EU, regional multilateral organisations, 
and regional powers will probably continue to diplomatically support the 
reconstituted TFG, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged to Sheik 
Sharif when she met him in Kenya during her August visit, and especially 
to endorse any of its efforts to defeat or co-opt al-Shabaab. Most of those 
who have joined jihadist militias have done so for practical rather than 
ideological reasons. Further, al-Shabaab’s popular support is fragile owing 
to its imposition of harsh vice laws. And Somalis in general are more 
nationalistic (at times, xenophobic) than Islamist, and therefore are not 
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likely to stay well-disposed towards any al-Qaeda connections maintained 
by the Somali Islamist militias. Substantially weakening them therefore 
may be doable. To encourage non-violent political participation and drive a 
wedge between al-Qaeda and the Somali Islamist groups, the US may 
consider removing groups like Hizbul Islam and eventually even the more 
intransigent al-Shabaab, or certain individual members, from its official 
lists of terrorist organisations and suspects. It appears possible that Aweys 
could be amenable to breaking Hizbul Islam’s ties to al-Shabaab in favour 
of a power-sharing deal with the TFG. 
To avoid broader Somali hostility, counter-terrorism tactics could also 
be altered to minimise collateral damage, as in the American operation in 
which Nabhan was killed, which involved a helicopter assault that allowed 
for more selective targeting. While his death undoubtedly disrupted al-
Shabaab’s and al-Qaeda’s regional planning, recruitment, and training 
capabilities in the short run, the downside is that the al-Qaeda leadership 
void could prompt al-Shabaab and the East Africa cell to move forward 
with a merger and form a more tightly run and potentially more dangerous 
operation. If that or other factors impelled al-Shabaab to increase pressure 
on the TFG, reinforcing Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM troops could be 
necessary to ensure their continued commitment to supporting the TFG.  
Piracy and rising Islamist militancy have intensified US and 
European diplomatic interest in Somalia. At the same time, initial African 
perceptions that the establishment of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) 
signalled the ‘militarisation’ of US Africa policy, reinforced by the growing 
likelihood that the 2,300-strong Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti would become a long-term American base, have 
posed a strategic communications challenge for the United States.14 In 
addition, a deteriorating humanitarian situation in drought-plagued 
Somalia precipitated by the October 2009 US suspension of food aid over 
fears that aid workers were diverting it to terrorists, and the prospect of 
unmanageable numbers of Somali refugees fleeing over comparatively 
stable Kenya’s border, have increased pressure on Washington to revise US 
policy. These factors could lead to a new approach – consonant with the 
evolving emphasis on nuanced counter-insurgency – involving the 
application of soft power, such as development aid, with less scrutiny on 
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Vol. 51, No. 1, February-March, pp. 249-56. 
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governance.15 Robust, high-profile international diplomatic or military 
initiatives in Somalia, however, are unlikely. It follows that near-term 
developments in Somalia will probably follow the depressingly familiar 
pattern whereby the TFG and Islamist militias maintain an uneasy military 
stalemate, with neither building the political infrastructure and good will 
required to tip the balance decisively. 
 
                                                     
15 See Bruton, “In the Quicksands of Somalia”, op. cit. 
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Afghanistan: The Day After 
Radha Kumar* 
ince the Obama administration set 2011 as the date for withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, speculation has been rife on whether and how the 
deadline will be met. Although this date is actually fuzzy – it is 
doubtful whether 2011 will see even the beginning of an American 
drawdown – it has focused attention on the critical issues for stabilisation 
in Afghanistan that have remained unaddressed over the past nine years.  
The key goals today include  
• bringing on board the Taliban of eastern and southern Afghanistan in 
a peace and stabilisation process,  
• rolling back the spread of the Taliban in central and northern 
Afghanistan,  
• creating a legitimate and functioning administration, and  
• ensuring regional support and guarantees for a stable and peaceful 
Afghanistan.  
Few if any of these goals can be achieved in a year. What 2010–11 is 
more likely to reveal, therefore, is the extent of international commitment 
to these goals. Does the international community have the political will to 
pursue these goals until they are achieved? What would each entail? The 
following sections seek to explore these questions further.  
Bringing on board the Taliban in a peace and stabilisation process  
Whether 2011 will see an American drawdown or not depends largely on 
the degree of success of the ‘reconciliation’ policies of the US, Afghan, UK 
and Pakistan governments, which are still in development and are not 
necessarily the same.  
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Indeed, the fallout over the arrest (and rumoured release?) of Mullah 
Abdul Ghani Baradar indicates that sometimes the reconciliation policies of 
these governments can be at odds. From scattered reports it appears that 
Mullah Baradar, a senior Taliban leader and second in command of the 
Quetta shura, was a key figure in the back-channel talks between President 
Hamid Karzai’s government and the Taliban that were being held under 
Saudi aegis.  
The back-channel talks of the Karzai government were supposed to 
be complementary to the surge policy of the Obama administration, which 
combined military attack with a buyout strategy seeking to win over foot 
soldiers and local/mid-level commanders. President Karzai had made 
reconciliation with the Taliban a campaign plank and his first policy 
commitment after re-election. In the last six months of 2009, he issued a 
series of invitations to the Taliban for talks; at his request the Saudi 
government arranged a number of meetings between his representatives 
and high-level go-betweens for Taliban leaders based in Pakistan.  
In effect, a three-pronged strategy emerged – the Afghan government 
was to head attempts to negotiate with the Taliban leaders, while the 
international community would back buyout initiatives (targeting foot 
soldiers and mid-level commanders) with funds, and the US would back 
both prongs with military pressure to bring the Taliban into the 
negotiations. There appeared to be a dawning consensus on this approach; 
at the London conference in January 2010, attempts to harmonise the range 
of international policies towards Afghanistan led to bottom-line support for 
the Afghan–US policy of seeking to win over foot soldiers and local/mid-
level commanders.  
Although the Taliban leaders based in Pakistan rubbished Karzai’s 
offers, they also put out their own feelers, through, for example, statements 
pledging that if in power they would not let Afghanistan be used for 
terrorist attacks on other countries. Mullah Baradar’s arrest more or less 
brought these initiatives to a halt and neutralised a major prong of the 
reconciliation strategy. It is seen in Afghanistan as a Pakistani coup brought 
about to reassert Pakistani control over any reconciliation process. Whether 
this suspicion is true or false, the arrest has certainly brought Pakistan back 
to the centre – any negotiations with the Taliban will have to be with 
Pakistan’s concurrence, if not through Pakistan.  
The immediate fallout is that the Afghan government has been 
further weakened. President Karzai is now, more than ever before, 
dependent on Pakistan to pursue reconciliation with the Taliban. As a 
THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN | 85 
result, the international effort to ‘Afghanise’ the reconciliation is at risk of 
failing.  
Back to basics – The question of Pakistan’s role  
Only the wilfully blind would deny that Pakistan has a central role to play 
in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. But it would be severely myopic to 
believe that such a role is easy to define, let alone achieve. In the past few 
years influential analysts have suggested a ‘grand bargain’ in which 
Afghanistan would be in Pakistan’s sphere of influence, with international 
acquiescence, and in return Pakistan would persuade the Taliban to accept 
and perhaps join the Afghan government. More recently, some Pakistani 
policy analysts have suggested a different kind of grand bargain, one in 
which the Taliban leadership could enter a power-sharing government in 
Afghanistan, with a contact group to monitor security that would comprise 
all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including closely connected but not 
border-sharing India.  
While an arrangement of this sort could act as a reassurance to 
neighbours, it begs the critical questions of consensus within Afghanistan, 
and also, significantly, within Pakistan. Not only are Pakistanis polarised 
over their Afghanistan policy, but also Pakistan itself is in a state of 
considerable instability. Most policy prescriptions rest on the assumption 
that Pakistan is a relatively stable and consistent actor. Prior to 9/11 it 
might have been possible to assume that the Pakistan army was a stable 
actor (unlike its political parties and administration), but that assumption 
does not hold today even for the army. US-influenced attempts to purge 
radical Islamists from Pakistan’s security establishment have left a 
seriously divided force that unites only in a spoiler role – for strategic 
depth in Afghanistan, against the enemy India. The implications of this 
division–unity problem for an Afghan reconciliation policy are grave.  
Reconciliation also has internal implications for Pakistan. A policy 
that strengthens the Taliban will embolden them and associated groups 
that destabilise the Pakistani state. In Swat, remnants of the Taliban have 
already come out of hiding. The Afghan/Pakistani Taliban distinction is 
one that many Pakistani analysts reject, but the fact remains that 
reconciliation might also have to include those who are termed the 
Pakistani Taliban. Obviously, this would entail an expanded reconciliation 
policy, covering the regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. With a 
bitter history of failed peace agreements in Swat and Waziristan, it is not 
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clear whether Pakistani civil society (which ardently backed military 
operations against the Taliban) or mainstream, regional political parties 
such as the Awami National Party (which have been the chief targets of the 
Pakistani Taliban) will support reconciliation with groups they have come 
to regard as existential foes.  
Today it appears that there is a very clear divide in Pakistan’s policy 
community, between those who back the strategic approach and those who 
seek a political approach. This divide is at its clearest when it comes to 
analysis of the role of the peace jirga(s) [large assembly]. Pakistani policy 
analysts who were involved in back-channel efforts with the Taliban in the 
early years following 9/11 argue that an important opportunity to involve 
the Taliban leadership was missed in 2002–03, when the Grand Loya Jirga 
was convened, and Pakistan had worked hard behind the scenes to get the 
Taliban on board. They suggest that another such opportunity could be 
created now.  
Other Pakistani analysts caution that a focus on the grand peace jirga 
should not lose sight of the district-by-district plan for reconciliation, and 
suggest that local peace jirgas that complement the local-level buyout 
strategy are essential building blocks to reconciliation. Theoretically, these 
could complement the all-Afghan peace jirga, which would gain both 
substance and input from the ground; still, much would depend on how 
widely they can be organised.  
While a segment of the Pakistani government believes that their 
cooperation with the reconciliation policy should be tied to an exclusion or 
further restriction of India’s role, there is a much greater acceptance among 
influential Pakistani civilians of India’s presence in Afghanistan. As 
initiatives for regional consensus building grow, the trick is going to be 
how to give the yea-sayers a larger public voice than the nay-sayers. 
Potential hitches to the reconciliation policy  
Whether Afghan society is prepared for a grand bargain with Taliban 
leaders is unclear. Most Afghans, including parliamentarians, would 
support the rehabilitation and reintegration of lower-level Taliban; but the 
jury is still out when it comes to figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani or even 
Mullah Mohammed Omar. The reintegration of former mujahidin 
commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is an example of how it can work – 
today his Hezb-e-Islami is the premier party in Afghanistan, with a number 
of members in parliament.  
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But there is also a sizable Afghan constituency that wants a 
professional rather than power-sharing government, with the past as a 
closed chapter. This constituency also supports reconciliation; however, 
they argue that reconciliation has to be broad-based and political 
conciliation is as important as reconciliation with the Taliban. And they 
point out that there could be a potentially negative impact for the 
reconciliation policy, in that Afghan disaffection with poor governance will 
increase if power-sharing entails an increase of warlords in power.  
Managing these two divergent trends will be a challenge for the 
reconciliation policy. The current pledge to focus on good governance is 
one way to do so, although it is a formidable task given that corruption and 
accountability are not within the sole control of the Afghanistan 
government and would require coordinated efforts from all donors and 
investors.  
Good governance is in any case a chimera when it comes to societies 
that have been deeply fragmented as a result of protracted conflict. The 
Karzai government was weak from the start and has been further 
weakened by a chaotic and oscillating set of international policies that have 
made the government more dependent on warlords rather than less. It may 
be that governance issues are on a back burner while the focus in on 
improving security through reconciliation. But as the Marjah situation 
indicates, governance and security have a symbiotic relationship. This is 
something the Taliban have grasped – witness the recent spate of killings of 
mayors and their deputies in the provinces. 
Regional actors  
There is also the question of how other influential players – neighbours, 
regional allies or powers – relate to the reconciliation policy. Its success 
requires support from other regional actors, in particular Russia, India and 
Iran, who were opponents of the Taliban during their years of rule.  
Iran has made its opposition to reconciliation clear by staying away 
from the London conference, but it did attend the Turkish conference. The 
Iranian government has apparently sought its own buyout strategy with 
the Taliban in Afghanistan, but that might only be protection money. There 
is still no evident interlocutor with Iran on Afghanistan, which means 
Iran’s response is still difficult to predict. Russia and China are currently 
playing a watching game. Most of the other neighbours feel relatively 
powerless.  
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Yet for reconciliation to work, Russia, India and Iran need to be on 
board, which means they need to participate in regional efforts at 
consensus building. In this context, Turkey made a serious mistake in 
excluding India from the January 2010 regional conference that it hosted on 
the stabilisation of Afghanistan.  
Turkey’s action did not take place in a vacuum. The failure to 
conclude a new Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement by the end 
of December 2009, the fact that it was Pakistan’s opposition that led Turkey 
to exclude India and the terrorist attacks on Indians by the Pakistan based 
Lashkar-e-Taiba in India and Afghanistan in January and February have 
combined to give Pakistan’s competition with India the edge over 
cooperation. These events would appear to be a further setback to the 
prospects for Indian–Pakistani support or cooperation for facilitating peace 
in Afghanistan. 
At the same time, these developments also underline how critical 
India and Pakistan’s joint support is – without which, it seems, 
Afghanistan’s stabilisation will continue to be impeded. Is there anything 
that can be done to ease this pressure on Afghanistan’s already 
overburdened and as yet still-nascent peace process?  
Once again, international policy is at odds on the issue. The Obama 
administration has moved a step further than the Bush administration in 
welcoming India’s role in Afghan reconstruction and development, and is 
now exploring ways in which the two countries can cooperate. The few 
European countries that are deeply engaged in Afghanistan appear not to 
have discussed the issue among themselves, let alone with Afghans, 
Pakistanis and Indians. This author was rather startled to see references to 
India as a ‘spoiler’ in another paper on this topic1 – as far as Afghans are 
concerned such a description could not be further from the truth. India 
remains the most popular foreign country in Afghan polls and is well 
regarded at the local level even in Taliban areas.  
The Afghan government and civil society are also committed to 
improving relations between the three countries; indeed, the importance of 
this issue for Afghanistan was evident when both the frontrunners for the 
                                                     
1 See Fabrice Pothier, “Afghanistan: Shifting from a state of war to a political state” 
in R. Walliullah, F. Pothier and R. Kumar, The Political Future of Afghanistan, 
European Security Forum Working Paper No. 34, CEPS, Brussels, 2010. 
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presidential election made peacemaking between their country, Pakistan 
and India a campaign plank. As President Karzai stated at his second-term 
inauguration, India and Pakistan are among his top foreign-relations 
priorities in this presidential term. Afghans from all sectors are united on 
this issue – they do not want to have to choose between India and Pakistan.  
India’s options  
After Afghanistan itself and Pakistan, of all countries, India’s security is 
most closely threatened by what happens in Afghanistan. With terrorist 
attacks on Indian civilians in Afghanistan (the latest by the Taliban in 
February 2010) and news now coming out that the 2008 Mumbai attacks 
were partly planned and organised there, India has major concerns about 
any return of the Taliban.  
At the beginning of 2009, most Indian policy-makers and analysts 
would have been opposed to any deal with the Taliban; today there is 
support for a reconciliation policy targeting foot soldiers and field 
commanders, as the Indian foreign minister’s remarks at the London 
conference made clear (with the caveat that these opportunities should be 
offered to all mujahidin, not just the Taliban).  
The current position of the Indian government is in consonance with 
long-standing policy towards domestic insurgent groups, in which 
rehabilitation and reintegration is commonly offered to militants who wish 
to renounce violence and use constitutional means to achieve their goals.  
Were the Taliban to join guarantees that India would not be attacked 
from Afghanistan nor would Indians be persecuted within Afghanistan, a 
wider constituency that favours the reconciliation policy could develop. For 
India, it was a confidence-booster that reconciliation was led by President 
Karzai, albeit with a major role for Pakistan. With the Afghan leadership 
now in question (Europe, especially, appears to be leaning towards 
Pakistani leadership of the reconciliation efforts), India might recalibrate its 
approach. The return of an unreconstructed Taliban, the Indian 
government fears, could not only turn Afghanistan back to the late 1990s, 
but also undermine the Pakistani state’s current battle with extremism and 
its long-term stabilisation. 
Important but neglected aspects of stabilisation  
Most observers agree that intraregional trade is a critical paving stone for 
peace and could provide an essential impetus to Afghanistan’s economic 
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recovery. India has offered its markets for Afghan goods, and given the size 
of the Indian market, this could provide rapid economic boosts for the 
agricultural sector in Afghanistan, on which 80% of its population depend.  
But attempts to increase trade have been held hostage by mistrust in 
Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and India. There are two key issues 
that have hung fire for close to a decade now:  
• the Pakistan–Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, and  
• an energy corridor from Central Asia through Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to India.  
Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a Transit Trade Agreement in 1965. 
The agreement became an issue after the Bonn agreement, when 
Afghanistan’s new government sought land access through Pakistan for 
humanitarian aid, and the difficulties gathered storm when India and 
Afghanistan sought to use the agreement for trade. In 2009, wrangles over 
renegotiating elements of the agreement prevented Afghanistan from 
exporting its bumper crop of fruit and vegetables to India, causing large 
losses for Afghan farmers and setting back Afghanistan’s efforts to revive 
its non-poppy agricultural economy. Eventually, India decided to bypass 
the problem by airlifting consignments for the Indian market directly from 
Afghanistan. In May 2009, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding for transit trade at a meeting in 
Washington. Under the Memorandum, the two countries committed to 
signing a revised Transit Trade Agreement by the end of December 2009, 
but talks in December foundered, and it is hoped that the agreement will be 
negotiated in 2010. The energy corridor is similarly stalemated.  
In the meantime, Afghan analysts believe that a regional rather than 
bilateral framework might work best for Pakistan. The Third Regional 
Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan made the point that 
progress on regional arrangements, such as the South Asia Free Trade Area 
Agreement (SAFTA) to which Afghanistan is a party, is urgently required. 
The conference also highlighted that there is a general consensus that 
SAFTA needs to be fast-tracked, especially with Afghanistan as a new 
member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), whose stabilisation would benefit greatly from the opening of 
regional markets.  
It is hoped that a trade agreement covering these aspects will be 
agreed at the SAARC summit at the end of April 2010. But it will require 
concerted regional and international support to become a reality.  
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Conclusions  
The three-pronged reconciliation policy, which combines a surge–conquer–
hold strategy with a buyout for the local and mid-level Taliban and 
calibrated negotiations with the Taliban, is still in the phase of teething 
pains. Trying to impose an accelerated timetable on it could be very 
counter-productive. Reconciliation is the key to stabilisation in Afghanistan 
– provided that is it not limited to the Taliban alone, but includes wider 
political and provincial reconciliation within Afghanistan. Without this 
wider context the risk of anti-Taliban Afghan actors mobilising their own 
protection will be heightened. In the rush to reconcile with the Taliban, the 
danger of ignoring the reaction of opposing Afghan groups, many with 
armed loyalties of their own, is high.  
Second, the search for Pakistan to play a key role in the reconciliation 
process needs to be very carefully worked out, with inputs from civil 
society and independent analysts, so that Pakistan’s own battle against 
extremism and Afghanistan’s quest for sovereignty are not compromised.  
Third, the policy of seeking regional support and guarantees from 
Afghanistan’s neighbours requires beefing up. Each of them faces a 
heightened security threat from any policy that does not have the support 
of all the powerful Afghan actors. At present, Turkey appears to have taken 
a lead on it, but has already messed up. Admittedly, the regional actors are 
unlikely to accept leadership by any of those among their ranks. Yet, they 
are likely to respond to a series of initiatives by regional actors, especially 
India, Iran and China, which could be separate but interlocking.  
Finally, while deadlines and timetables are important, if they are not 
based on the ground realities they can create further instability. 
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Afghanistan: Shifting from 
a State of War to a Political State 
Fabrice Pothier* 
fter almost nine years of the campaign in Afghanistan, soldiers, 
diplomats and experts alike agree on at least one thing: the solution 
to the conflict is political and not military. Beyond that, there is 
little of a concrete political strategy. This was revealed yet again at the 
London conference last January where, despite talks of transition in 
Afghanistan, the international community and the Kabul government have 
failed to produce a realistic proposition to draw the conflict to an end. 
There is urgency. The clocks for the campaign in Afghanistan are ticking – 
the Afghan population mistrusts Kabul as well as the international 
community’s support for the leadership of President Hamid Karzai; 
Afghan wealth and elites are fleeing the country at a growing pace; 
Western public opinion is averse to more casualties and increasingly 
sceptical about the mission as a whole; and, after nearly nine years, political 
leaders – in both Afghanistan and the West – listen more to the sirens of 
local politics and the power game than to principled commitment and 
cooperation centred on good will.  
Adding to that, the latest US military surge is also the last. NATO’s 
military footprint has reached a ceiling. It has 150,000 troops of which 
fewer than a third are active, deployable combat troops (US, UK, Danish, 
some French troops and a few special operations troops). This means that 
the next 12 months are the last throw of the dice on the military front and 
that the political front is becoming ever more important.  
Yet few realistic political options have been proposed so far. That is 
to say, few apart from one: reconciliation, which stood as the international 
community’s new silver bullet announced at the London conference. It 
consists of buying off low- to mid-level insurgents and presumably 
reintegrating them into Afghan society. Beyond the many serious 
operational problems that such an approach poses, it is also based on the 
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false premises that Taliban insurgents (including the rank and file) are 
motivated by economics and not politics, and that there are ‘moderate’ or 
‘grey’ Taliban members as opposed to just hard-core ones. But more 
fundamentally, in its haste to find short-term exit scenarios, the Western 
coalition has mistaken reconciliation for a political end in itself, rather than 
for what it is – a tactical move to defuse the insurgency.  
For the negotiations with the insurgents to work as a bridge from a 
state of war to a political state, they need to be part of a broader process of 
redefining Afghanistan’s institutional and political balance. Offering a few 
cabinet seats and local appointments to the insurgents in exchange for 
peace is unlikely to address the growing disconnect between ethnic balance 
and the power distribution, and is likely to lead to a backlash from Karzai’s 
northern Afghanistan allies. Meanwhile, a Taliban regime is neither a 
desirable nor a realistic option. A process whereby all factions in 
Afghanistan (the disgruntled Pashto tribes, including but not only those 
represented by the Taliban, and those from the former Northern Alliance) 
take part in a legitimate process of rebalancing power and resources is a 
difficult yet necessary way forward for Afghanistan. Success is far from 
guaranteed but the alternatives – rampant conflict, weakening Afghan 
institutions and the fragmentation of power – are much worse. It is 
therefore time to shift the debate from whether we should negotiate to how 
and for what outcome, and place it in the broader need for political reform 
and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Machiavelli’s advice to the prince was to 
consider time the very essence of political action, and the time for a broad 
process of negotiations is now.  
Reconciliation vs. negotiations 
The London conference failed to make the leap towards the call for a full 
political resolution process with the insurgents and other disaffected 
groups. Instead, it chose to promote the narrower notion of reconciliation, 
i.e. buying local insurgents away from the battlefield. A special trust fund 
with up to $140 million of pledges from international donors was set up. 
Previous attempts at reconciliation have failed to make a difference. There 
were technical, operational reasons for this outcome: the attempts were 
poorly funded, lacked real job reintegration schemes and failed to include 
de-radicalisation infrastructures like those developed in Indonesia or Saudi 
Arabia. More significantly, past failures also stemmed from a flawed 
reading of the nature of the Afghan insurgency. 
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Broken or absent local institutions and competing informal actors 
have meant that such a cash-for-peace scheme is almost impossible to 
administer, especially in conflict zones like southern Afghanistan where it 
would primarily be implemented. There is nothing wrong with buying 
peace or buying your way towards consolidating legitimate state power. A 
recent article on foreign affairs about the centralisation efforts of the French 
ancien régime shows how successful French kings were at co-opting the 
rebel-prone gentry through privileges and money. In the case of 
Afghanistan, however, attempts to buy actors off have always resulted in 
the opposite effect: parts of the central authority are dismembered and 
‘given away’ to local players, whose militias maintain security instead of 
the national police, further reinforcing centrifugal forces that undermine 
the emergence of an Afghan state. This point is illustrated by President 
Karzai’s appointment of regional lords like Rashid Dostum or Marshal 
Mohammad Fahim in senior government posts, respectively as chief of the 
army and vice-president, to cement support in northern provinces of 
Afghanistan for the presidential elections. 
But more fundamentally and as noted earlier, this approach to 
reconciliation rests on the false premises that local insurgents are driven by 
economics rather than politics. And that offering them economic 
alternatives – cash as well as jobs – will be enough to take them away from 
the battlefield and ultimately weaken the insurgency. This 
oversimplification fails to acknowledge that the core factor fuelling the 
insurgency from its leadership in Quetta to local commanders is a complex 
mix of social and political grievances. Undoubtedly, there is degree of 
economic opportunism within the insurgency, including the Taliban 
enabling the drugs industry to flourish in exchange for money and arms, or 
rank-and-file members receiving a monthly stipend allegedly higher than 
those offered in the Afghan national police or army. Yet overall the 
insurgency is riding on a blend of nationalistic-cum-xenophobic views 
(driving the foreigners and their ‘clients’ in Kabul out of the country) and 
reactionary Islam (preserving a traditional social order against the threat of 
modernisation and progress). Even at the local level, social pressure to join 
the insurgency is likely to play an important role. We should not 
underestimate the extent to which some Pashto tribes and groups have felt 
excluded from the power and money redistribution of post-2001 
Afghanistan, and the extent to which the Taliban have masterfully 
leveraged the disgruntlement of some tribes and groups to consolidate 
their base in southern Afghanistan. Even outside the Pashto belt, in 
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northern provinces such as Kunduz, the Taliban have proven highly 
effective at playing tribal subgroups against one another as well as 
attaching to the tribal identity that is receding, especially in the south, a 
Pashtu-centric political narrative advocating a traditional social order 
based on a combination of tribal code and fundamental Islam.1 Observers 
who have travelled to Taliban heartlands like rural Kandahar often remark 
that apart from kites and music, which are now allowed, the social order in 
those areas has barely changed since the Taliban were in power in the 
1990s. 
Nevertheless, NATO commanders believe that in parallel to the direct 
military pressure economic incentives might help break the insurgency’s 
stride. Still, a deeper process of political negotiations is missing and is 
needed, even if the US counter-insurgency strategy manages to regain the 
momentum. This was the original sin in 2001 at the Bonn conference when 
the defeated (Taliban) and their ally (Pakistan) were absent from the 
political arrangements. Actually, the Bonn process produced Afghan 
institutions based on a Traité-de-Versailles mindset of rewarding the winners 
and excluding the losers. What is now needed is a post-Bonn process that 
overcomes the distinction between winners and losers, and instead outlines 
a win-win political process for all major Afghan factions.  
‘Too many cooks’…  
Negotiations with insurgents will inevitably involve many actors with 
conflicting interests; almost all actors have as many reasons to engage in 
negotiations as in making them fail. While many have wondered who will 
be the negotiating partner on the side of the Taliban – the Quetta shura, the 
Haqqani network or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – the question also stands for 
the other side of the negotiating table. The Kabul government plays a 
central role yet is not in a position to provide the security guarantees that 
will be crucial to a deal, while Islamabad, which so far acts more as a 
spoiler than a facilitator holds many security and political keys to the 
Quetta shura. The US holds the biggest sticks and carrots but cannot be the 
one sealing a deal. Regional powers such as India, Russia and Iran form 
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what could be called an ‘arc of sceptics’; a final outcome is unlikely to 
depend on them but they are in a position to upset the negotiation process. 
Finally, the UN and Saudi Arabia can act at different levels as facilitators – 
the former giving the final settlement the needed international recognition 
and the latter providing a venue for proximity talks as well leaning on the 
Taliban and Pakistani partners.  
First is the central local player: the Kabul government. The 
conventional wisdom says that Kabul should lead the negotiation efforts. If, 
however, the government needs to be part of the solution, it is also in many 
respects one of the main impediments to a political settlement. Senior 
government officials, including President Karzai and those from the non-
Pashto ethnic groups from northern Afghanistan (mainly the Tajiks and 
Uzbeks) have very little interest in seeing their formal, and more 
importantly, informal power networks threatened by new political players. 
The proposition advocated by senior members of the Afghan cabinet 
during the London conference that the Taliban are welcome if they abide 
by the constitution is a non-starter. It fails to acknowledge that the 2003 
constitution born out of the Bonn process is part of the problem and needs 
to be reformed: the electoral system and calendar should be overhauled, 
the judiciary strengthened and the centralisation of power rebalanced with 
more resources and autonomy given to the local level. Moreover, the 
current Afghan institutions, particularly the office of the president, are 
widely considered both ineffective and lacking in credibility (as 
acknowledged by the current US ambassador to Kabul in candid cables to 
the US state secretary),2 especially since the fraudulent 2009 elections. In his 
West Point speech in December 2009,3 President Barack Obama refuted the 
comparison between the campaign in Afghanistan and the one in Vietnam. 
He omitted one obvious truth: that the Karzai government – from its 
                                                     
2 See the link to the leaked cables on the website of the New York Times, 
“Ambassador Eikenberry's Cables on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan” 
(http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-
afghanistan#p=1). 
3 Refer to US White House, “Remarks by the President in an Address to the Nation 
on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, United States Military 
Academy at West Point, New York, 1 December 2009 (retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-
way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan). 
THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN | 97 
ineffective and corrupt institutions and weak security forces to its low 
credibility among the population – shares many common features with the 
then US-sponsored Saigon government, and could well share its doomed 
fate if not reformed. The Taliban are no Vietcong, and Pakistan’s covert 
support is no match to that provided at the time by the Soviet Union, but it 
remains clear that Kabul is a weak negotiating partner. Other external 
players, especially the US, need to follow the twin track of strengthening 
Kabul while in parallel actively enabling peace negotiations, especially 
when the partner in Kabul is reluctant or too weak to engage.  
Pakistan is the second central player in a negotiation process but not 
without deep ambiguities. Its tribal frontier regions, which host a larger 
Pashto population than that on the Afghan side, have provided the main 
logistical and political hubs for the Afghan Taliban insurgents, with their 
notorious chief, Mullah Mohammed Omar, allegedly based in Quetta. 
Pakistan politico-military thinking is still very much embedded in an 
existential struggle against India, where Afghanistan is used through the 
Taliban and other proxies to provide an all-vital ‘strategic depth’. The 
recent Taliban attacks in Kabul, which were targeted at the Indian embassy 
and guesthouses frequented by Indian expatriates, stand as a reminder that 
Afghanistan is the Western frontline in the ongoing Pakistan–Indian 
confrontation. Those attacks, with their sophistication and multiple-target 
strategy, could have not been executed without enablement from the 
Pakistan security apparatus. The thinking and actions of the Pakistan 
military – the leading institution (and economic stakeholders) in the 
country – remain torn between a strategy of fomenting insurgency (FOIN) 
on their Western flank and beyond the Durand line to one of waging 
counter-insurgency (COIN).4 At the same time, what constitutes Pakistan’s 
role in a direct lethal threat to coalition troops in eastern and southern 
Afghanistan, also represents an opportunity to make Islamabad part of a 
broader political settlement. Facilitating a negotiation process between the 
Karzai government and the Quetta shura offers Islamabad the prospect of 
placing some its pawns in the formal political process in Afghanistan. 
Indeed, the capture by Pakistani forces of the deputy Afghan Taliban chief 
is seen by many observers as a way for Pakistan to invite itself to the 
negotiating table; it sends the basic message that no negotiations can be 
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Insurgencies, JSOU Report 09-0, Hurlburt Field, Florida: JSOU Press, 2009. 
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finalised without Pakistan’s involvement and assent. On the other hand, it 
can also be argued that the current FOIN and covert strategy can provide 
more strategic edge than the highly uncertain process of political 
settlements. The Pakistani leadership is unlikely to have forgotten the 1990s 
when the more the Taliban became the dominant political power in 
Afghanistan the less Islamabad had any leverage on the group.  
The regional dimension of negotiating with the Taliban is not 
confined to Pakistan. Even though Iran, Russia and India are unlikely to 
play a major role in the negotiations, they hold stakes high enough to 
influence, positively or negatively, their outcome. In addition, these three 
countries form the arc of scepticism about negotiations with the Taliban.  
Russia is the reluctant northern player in Afghanistan. Since 2001, 
Moscow’s approach to Afghanistan has been narrowly focused on two 
threats: narcotics and the spread of radical Islam in former Soviet republics. 
Because of its ‘Afghan syndrome’, Moscow’s involvement has remained 
mostly technical through allowing the crossing of NATO’s non-lethal and 
lethal supplies from the Baltic Sea, training anti-narcotic troops in 
Tajikistan and supporting the former Northern Alliance. Drugs have 
probably been the issue on which Moscow has recently been most vocal 
and concerned. With a population of 2.3 million addicts, 80% of Russian 
suffering from HIV/AIDS also being injection drug users and 70 tonnes of 
Afghan heroin reaching its streets every year (this is proportionally much 
higher than the 88 tonnes that reach the rest of Europe), Russia is one of the 
main destination markets for Afghan heroin. It is little surprise then that 
Moscow, including more recently its drug envoy during a visit to NATO, 
calls for greater efforts by NATO to fight drug trafficking in and out of 
Afghanistan.  
However legitimate, these concerns are unlikely to produce any 
policy shift for several reasons. First, is a failure to see that NATO, and 
more specifically the US and the UK, has been grossly ineffective at 
tackling the Afghan opium industry despite years of aggressive crop-
eradication campaigns and billions of dollars poured into so-called 
‘alternative development’. This approach clashes against one fundamental 
reality: the cost of tackling drug production in a conflict zone like southern 
Afghanistan, which lacks basic governance and rule of law, and 
implementing a functional counter-narcotics strategy is higher than the 
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benefits. Similar regional cases like Burma show that a significant reduction 
in illegal opium production is possible only after a local conflict has been 
brought to an end.5 Simultaneously waging a war against an insurgency 
and one against the drug industry is not only a dangerous overstretch, it 
compromises higher stabilisation goals. Second, too great a focus has been 
given to fighting cultivation, the poorest segment of the opium value chain 
– farmers traditionally account roughly for 15% of the multibillion dollar 
opium industry – and too little at tackling high-end trafficking, which 
concentrates the most valuable, corroding and dangerous parts of the value 
chain.  
What Moscow also overlooks is that its serious drug-consumption 
problem can be fought more effectively domestically with comprehensive 
and progressive public-health interventions, such as programmes for 
substitution (methadone, a rather cheap and effective substitution to 
heroin, widely used in Western Europe, is still illegal in Russia) and clean-
needle exchange. These could be bolstered by smarter law enforcement 
(going after traffickers instead of users or small-time traders). But the 
wounds of the Soviet campaign and its humiliating withdrawal in 1989 
remain prominent in the Russian political-military psyche. This is a 
determining factor in Russia’s reluctant involvement and in its opposition 
to see a return of the Taliban, even under a more acceptable political 
accord. Moscow additionally holds conflicting views about NATO’s 
presence in Afghanistan: on the one hand it wants NATO to contain a 
much-feared Islamist radicalism; while on the other hand a successful 
NATO could further upset Moscow’s influence in Central Asia. Indeed, 
Russia seems not to have decided yet between a minimalist post-2001 
approach or a more maximalist one using vehicles like the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
to develop a more regional response to post-NATO Afghanistan. Still, as 
two experts on Russia rightly note, “[i]ronically, Russia’s negative interests 
in Afghanistan are more important than the positive ones”.6 As a 
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permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) member, Russia holds an 
important card, especially for giving greater tacit and formal support for 
the UN to play an active role in facilitating a political settlement. This 
would involve the removal of Taliban leaders from the UNSC’s terrorist 
list. The process was started just before the London conference, probably as 
a show of good will, but more is likely to be required to secure a deal with 
the Taliban leadership. A greater role for Russia within NATO’s 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including the sharing of 
some intelligence briefings, could make Moscow more open to giving the 
UN an expanded mandate on political negotiations. 
With direct security concerns in mind, India looks with nervous eyes 
upon the idea of bringing the Taliban into the main political fold in 
Afghanistan. New Delhi, which has pledged up to $1 billion for 
reconstruction in Afghanistan and is deepening its commercial and 
diplomatic ties with Kabul, sees negotiations as potentially a victory for 
Pakistan. That notwithstanding, some clear security guarantees – that 
Indian interests and personnel in Afghanistan will not be threatened and 
that Islamabad will dismantle groups like Lashka-e-Taiba – could hold the 
key to India’s acceptance of a political deal with the Taliban.  
As the holder of both the biggest carrots and sticks, the US is a 
determining factor and player in the process. Yet the US cannot overtly 
lead the negotiations process and run the risk of ‘de-Afghanising’ the 
efforts. For example, until recently President Karzai was leading the efforts 
to engage with the Taliban, which were viewed by India as a ‘confidence 
booster’ according to regional expert Rahda Kumar.7 Nonetheless, in light 
of Karzai’s fundamental weakness, the US must play an active role as a 
stimulator of a reluctant Afghan leadership and a security guarantor to the 
insurgents who lay down their arms (while stopping targeted killings and 
imprisonment in Bagram) along with enforcing guarantees that the Taliban 
will refrain from targeting international personnel and representatives. The 
most realistic scenario is if the US, under the legitimacy of the UN, gives 
the negotiations the impulse they need to allow a deal to hold. This would 
entail bringing together in Islamabad the various reluctant players from the 
Karzai administration, addressing the concerns of regional sceptics like 
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India or Russia and ultimately providing the security guarantees – no 
association with al-Qaeda and laying down arms against an end to targeted 
killings and arrests.  
Finally, despite its loss of credibility after the August presidential 
elections, the UN remains the best-suited and most credible framework the 
Western coalition can use to support and enable political negotiations. But 
if it is to play such role, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan needs a 
new, reinforced mandate. The current mandate recently renewed under 
UNSC Resolution 1868 puts the emphasis on peacekeeping and aid 
coordination, with the UN largely being outweighed by the NATO ISAF 
and the US operations, while it provides only a limited mandate for 
‘political outreach’. An expanded mandate would shift priorities from 
peacekeeping to facilitating a peace agreement.  
The known unknowns that can upset the political process 
Circumstances in Afghanistan have been fast evolving with an overall 
trend towards the degradation of political, human and security indicators. 
Several new factors ranging from the impact of the US military and civilian 
surge, targeted killings of insurgency leaders and the general elections that 
should take place in September 2010 could significantly alter the context in 
both positive and negative ways. The targeted killings and arrests of 
Taliban senior commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as Taliban 
military chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi in February 2010, 
come with very ambivalent implications. On the one hand it exerts pressure 
on the Taliban leadership, disrupts its lines of command and triggers 
fractious power struggles within the movement. The Pakistan-based 
Taliban are known to feel more vulnerable and disrupted under the US 
drone attacks and Pakistan’s occasional cooperation. On the other hand, 
vulnerability does not imply a fundamental change of ideology or 
approach among the core Taliban. On the contrary, the arrests or killings of 
Taliban operatives are likely to have a disruptive effect on the negotiations 
by removing the old Taliban guard, to be replaced by a lesser known and 
often more radical new guard, who will be less inclined to be negotiation 
partners. The capture of commanders like Mullah Baradar is read by some 
as a warning by some elements of the Pakistani security apparatus that 
those who contemplate negotiations will be eliminated.  
A wild card would be another al-Qaeda attack against Western 
civilians. This wild card would render the differentiation between Taliban 
and al-Qaeda irrelevant. The notion of negotiations with the Taliban would 
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become a political taboo again for a US administration too easily accused of 
appeasement. This was clearly the case when the Obama administration 
reversed its decision of sending Yemeni inmates in Guantanamo back to 
Yemen following the botched bombing attempt by a Nigerian student with 
assistance in Yemen by al-Qaeda operatives. An attack led by a Pakistan-
based radical group, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, against Indian or Western 
targets would also significantly upset the precarious regional balance and 
harden India’s stance towards negotiations with the Taliban. 
Where does the deal end? 
The map of players and interests to involve in a negotiations process could 
not be more complex and conflicting. The question remains about what 
should be the objectives of the negotiations. It is unlikely that giving away 
a few cabinet seats or prestigious appointments will meet the Taliban’s 
demands. Meaningful negotiations need to aim at a deeper and more 
comprehensive package based on three aspects: security guarantees, 
power-sharing and institutional arrangements. On the security guarantees, 
a key demand from the both the Kabul government and the international 
community should be a temporary cease-fire. In exchange, targeted killings 
and arrests would cease while negotiations start. Longer term, the security 
guarantees should involve a progressive de-militarisation of the Taliban 
groups, including the integration of the Taliban rank and file as reserve 
forces (with uniforms and salaries but no arms) instead of militias. For the 
negotiations to be part of a long-term peace-building strategy rather than a 
short-term exit scenario, renegotiations of the Bonn institutions involving 
all Afghan factions – including groups represented by opposition leader Dr 
Abdulah Abdulah – are essential. This step should also provide an 
opportunity to sustain an Afghan-led effort to reform those institutions, i.e. 
the office of the president and the electoral commissions, which have 
proven in recent elections to be dysfunctional to the point of undermining 
the entire nation-building effort. The concerns voiced by some experts and 
groups that values such as women’s rights (the Afghan parliament has far 
more women MPs than the French one) and those of society as whole will 
be bargained away are legitimate. Nevertheless, these concerns miss the 
point that the Afghan polity has significantly shifted towards more 
conservative values than the West wants to recognise. The controversy in 
the summer 2009 over the passing of the ‘rape law’ as well as the 
condemnation of ordinary Afghans for alleged religious crimes are just a 
few of the many signs of a hardening of Afghan politics under President 
THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN | 103 
Karzai. Therefore, the introduction of Taliban leaders in the polity will not 
necessarily mark a significant shift. Ultimately, the redefinition of 
institutional balance and of Afghan values should be left to the Afghans 
themselves within the agreed framework of the rule of law. 
Such peace negotiations are fraught with obstacles: ambiguous 
stakeholders like Pakistan, weak players like the Afghan government and 
reluctant partners like India and Russia. Yet the alternative, which will 
involve a war of attrition, erosion of the international resolve despite 
possible military success and an accelerated fragmentation of power – is 
hardly an option.  
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fghan political society is at a standoff. The reasons for this are both 
domestic and external.  
Growing insurgency threatens the nation internally while regional 
ambitions threaten to tear the nation apart from the outside. The post-
Taliban democratic state faces existential strategic threats as a consequence.  
After nine years of military and political effort, national and 
international actors seem to have arrived at an impasse. Everyone from the 
president to the cabinet, to various peace commissions, to local and tribal 
leaders as well as shuras, to the international community, appreciates that 
time is running out. 
For NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 
December 2010 is a key deadline. General Stanley McChrystal, America's 
chief commander in Afghanistan, has said that by December of this year, 
the Obama administration expects there to be visible progress in stabilising 
the south, capacity built in the Afghan security forces and more territories 
ready to be transferred to the Afghan national forces. While some question 
this deadline, the world will be watching to see if NATO can achieve such 
progress in the deadlines it has been prescribed.  
What Afghans not engaged in the insurgency do not want to see, 
however, is a peace that is forged by handing the nation over to its most 
extreme elements. In other words, Afghans want to reconcile with the 
insurgents too, but not if the cost is that once again the country should be at 
the mercy of the Taliban hard-liners. Reconciliation with the Taliban should 
not mean submission of the Afghan people to the extremists. 
More than 100,000 Soviet forces could not stabilise Afghanistan as 
recently as the 1980s. Is it really any wonder that a domestic force of no 
more than 50,000 police and 70,000 soldiers is unable to stabilise the 
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country today? Afghanistan’s geographical challenges alone render these 
force numbers imprudent.  
It has been said that perhaps the Americans have been using what 
they did in Japan after WWII as their model for Afghanistan. That is, the 
idea has been to have a demilitarised state here. Obviously, Japan was a 
success but unfortunately that model could not work here. Afghans are 
infamous for their hard-line extremism and some elements of this culture 
have never been able to accept the idea of foreign rule, even at their own 
peril.  
Indeed, foreign ignorance of our traditions and ways has had 
devastating consequences in Afghanistan as everyone can attest to now, 
given the legions that have become disenfranchised from the international 
project because of insensitive night raids, house searches and the number of 
civilians who have been killed as the result of bad information, and no 
doubt worse informants.  
Then there are the issues our neighbours have that need to be 
factored into the calculation. Pakistan, for example, has yet to figure out 
that Afghanistan is not under Islamabad’s explicit control. But with billions 
of dollars in international aid underscoring Pakistan’s belief, it is not hard 
to understand why Islamabad seems to have such a vested interest in our 
affairs and in making sure their assistance in the war on terror continues to 
be funded. Not to mention the problems the Durand line has long caused 
our two nations.  
Pakistan has taken money out of Afghan markets by making sure that 
Karachi and Khyber are the main ports of entry into the country. When 
NATO supply lines have come under siege, it is Pakistan that has been paid 
the extra dollars to see that the lines are protected. Afghans suffer because 
they have to pay inflated prices for the goods that have to be imported. If 
this strategy has backfired to a certain extent – evidenced by the supply 
routes Afghans have alternatively forged through Iran – all the Afghans 
seem to have gotten out of the deal are increased concerns about Iranian 
influence from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and even the US.  
Iran and Pakistan have always been economic and political rivals in 
Afghanistan. With the international community in Afghanistan now, this 
rivalry has intensified.  
Moreover, Iran is not the only country that Pakistan does not want to 
see in Afghanistan. India’s presence here is also deeply resented. That India 
has been largely helpful to Afghanistan in the past nine years, putting its 
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efforts into various infrastructure projects, enrages Pakistan. While some 
experts believe that improving relations between the two countries spells 
relief for Afghanistan, it seems unlikely at this point that Pakistan is going 
to be easily persuaded that India’s welcome presence in Afghanistan is 
anything but a threat. 
Then there is the support that Pakistan gives to the Taliban. 
Supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan has become an institution in 
Pakistan and the Taliban are now at the point where it can be argued that 
they are able to threaten Islamabad itself.  
The military establishment of Pakistan – the army and Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) – has to date been the main supporter of the Taliban in the 
Pakistani government. The military establishment in Pakistan has looked to 
the Taliban to be their proxy force in Afghanistan. They use the Taliban to 
do everything, creating a sort of perverse balance to India’s good work in 
Afghanistan.  
Pakistan also uses the Taliban to ensure continued inflows of US anti-
terror money. In other words, Pakistan is fully aware of how much it has 
earned so far in the US war on terror, and understands how very profitable 
a long war on terror will be. The ISI thinks that a Taliban-free Afghanistan 
is not in Pakistan’s national interest – not with this kind of aid coming in. 
Pakistan’s instrumentalisation of the Taliban has netted some $11 billion 
over the past nine years. No wonder Pakistani army Chief General Ashfaq 
Kayani referred to Afghani militant commander Jalaluddin Haqqani as a 
strategic asset in an intercepted email in 2008. And it is this kind of money 
that makes certain high-profile attacks in Afghanistan will continue – 
especially attacks on Indians, at their embassy or on their doctors and guest 
workers resident here in guesthouses or even at the Kabul-Serena hotel. 
These attacks are to Pakistan like hitting two birds with one stone. 
That is why so many former ISI officials and Pakistani political 
characters rally to the defence of the Taliban. They share the Taliban’s 
extreme ideology and have shared economic interests. For example, former 
ISI chief General Hamid Gul is a vocal champion of the Taliban in Pakistan 
and one of the group’s founders. So recent statements of his, for instance 
that the Taliban are the future of Afghanistan or his saying that the recently 
arrested Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar should not be 
handed over to Afghan or American authorities because his only crime was 
illegally living in Pakistan, should come as no shock. The links between the 
ISI and the Taliban are even older than the Taliban itself. 
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The Taliban came out of Pakistan’s madrasahs – there are now some 
38,000 madrasahs potentially cranking out Taliban members – spread all 
over Pakistan. Many of these madrasahs, while not Darul Uloom 
madrasahs per se, share the same Deobandi–Salafi interpretation of Islam 
that the Taliban have. These madrasahs continue to produce new Taliban 
members. Until we change the curriculum and ideology in these 
madrasahs, they will keep turning out extremists insufficiently educated 
for anything but jihad. If Pakistan is trying to reform these schools, there 
seems to be little evidence to show for their efforts, even nine years and 
billions of dollars later. 
One wishes our problems ended there. Admittedly, we Afghans do 
love to point the finger when it comes to assigning blame for all the 
mistakes that confound us here. But we also recognise that we share much 
of the blame for our condition. First – and easiest to admit – are the 
mistakes our own leaders have made.  
Back in 2003, when the Taliban was still vanquished, we made the 
mistake of marginalising the warlords and mujahidin commanders who 
had brought the country to this point in an effort to neutralise them. After 
all, they had brought us civil war and then the Taliban, thanks to not 
knowing when it was time to lay down their arms and just get along.  
Democracy might have seemed to be the natural province of 
technocrats, but in marginalising the warlords all our government did was 
create an instant class of enemies and fierce enemies at that. Kabul did not 
bolster its control with this move, but rather divided the country into two 
factions – the government versus the warlords and the mujahidin that the 
government had just stripped of power. 
No wonder the Taliban found it easy to come back into Afghanistan. 
Of course they were never very far away in the first place. They only had to 
go as far as Pakistan to find a safe harbour, making their subsequent entry 
into Afghanistan all the easier.  
The Taliban might seem foreign to both the foreigners and the 
Afghans who live in Kabul. But we can never forget the traditional appeal 
they have for their co-extremists and fellow tribals in other areas of the 
country. Their radical ideology enabled them to obtain control of 90% of 
the country in the 1990s; today, it continues to threaten if not 90% then at 
least a good swathe. It is hard to think that the same ideology that attracts 
suicide bombers is an ideology that can be reconciled with democracy.  
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While we cannot get around the ethnocentric nature of the Afghan 
polity, our history does provide examples of the broad ethnic landscape 
that we have here. Yet, regardless of whether we have lived under 
kingdoms, republics, communism, mujahidin or the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, the common denominator of all of these various regimes that 
have tried to subdue our people is that they have all distributed their 
favours along mostly tribal or ethnic lines.  
During the reign of Afghan kings, the king’s tribe, family and 
ethnicity formed the first rung of power in Afghanistan, but they also 
comprised the second- and third-level ranks (the Tabaa in Dari). Only the 
relatives of the king or those whom he deigned to privilege were treated as 
citizens. The rest were subjects and very unequal subjects at that. Centuries 
under this kind of rule made Afghans believe that this was how all rulers 
necessarily wielded power.  
Afghans in effect became dehumanised. They were essentially – that 
is, in their own minds – either masters or slaves. There was no middle 
ground, no sense of basic rights and no belief that a people could hold its 
leaders accountable. Today, we see this played out in the legions of 
Afghans who think they are the subjects of this government and have little 
faith in a democratic government that they are told they can change at will.  
The hope that a post-Taliban Afghanistan represented, that the 
country could somehow go forward as any modern democratic state, only 
infected a small percentage of the population. While educated Afghans 
from a particular ethnicity might have cherished a dim hope that someday 
soon they would be able to talk about the benefits of citizenship in their 
homeland – for instance equal rights and democratic governance – the new 
phase had trouble catching on.  
Afghans could never really trust someone from outside their 
traditional power bases. And so when even democracy translated into the 
same old ethnocentric vision of power-grabbing that every other regime 
evidenced, Afghans were not surprised. They expected to see the ruler’s 
friends and family in the various new ministerial posts, the judiciary and 
even the parliament.  
And the ethnocentricity of our polity has only grown worse since the 
second election. The Pashtun–Tajik political rivalry has become more 
visible by the day: look at the ethnic makeup of the current Afghan cabinet 
or the parliament’s actions against the Hazara and the Uzbek ministers as 
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examples. In every key institution we can see evidence of the deep ethnic 
divides and discrimination that plague the unity of our nation.  
The general consensus within Afghanistan is that we must have some 
form of political reconciliation with and reintegration of the insurgents. 
This idea was loudly endorsed at the London conference where the goal 
was set and funds were supposed to be raised and allocated for a 
programme.  
But how exactly was this supposed to come about? Who were the 
Taliban with whom we were supposed to reconcile? Where would we find 
them? What would make them come over to the side of democracy? And 
what would be their price? In theory, reconciliation sounded great, but 
there was little to go on when it came time to actually implementing this 
process.  
One hopes the international community does not forget the blood 
that they and we Afghans have shed to get our democracy even this far. It 
is also to be hoped that whatever peace negotiations we agree upon to go 
forward will not make these sacrifices in vain, as the pre-conditions the 
Taliban has set would seem to render them. Their insistence on the 
withdrawal of foreign forces will mean one thing to the Afghans who have 
signed up to the democracy project so far: they will be ‘toast’ as the 
Americans say. And our constitution as we know it will go and the 
democratic state of Afghanistan will once again become the Islamic Emirate 
of the Taliban. And our children will have to put away their kites in a nod 
to the Taliban’s bizarre concept of sharia law.  
Everyone assembled knows that today, nine years after the 
American-led invasion, Afghanistan faces a political-military crisis that 
may threaten our process of democratisation and the survival of 
Afghanistan. If the democratic project fails, we can go down from here to a 
failed state and nation. We could become the world’s most corrupt state as 
opposed to its second most. Our weak democratic institutions could give 
way to Mullah Mohammed Omar and his kin. We could have instability in 
even more than half the nation. And the terrorists could come back along 
with their training camps and we could once again start exporting 
something even worse than the opium we export today.  
So what do we do? How do we come up with a peace plan that will 
finally work? How do we get our jihadists to focus on the war against their 
own illiteracy and ignorance as opposed to our foreign occupiers?  
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The answer is that we have to stop catering to the ethnicities that 
want to drag us backward. We should nationalise the peace project just 
because the majority of us are willing to live at peace with each other. We 
cannot allow those who terrorise us today to keep terrorising us tomorrow, 
in other words. And the way to do that is to prevent handing the 
insurgents the reins of the nation. We have to instead nationalise all of our 
institutions. We have to make Afghanistan a level playing field, not the 
battlefield of the Pashtuns or other ethnicities or the opium field of the 
criminals; we have to make the nation a place where everyone has equal 
access by virtue of being Afghan.  
We also need to convince Afghans and our international friends that 
the way forward is to clean up the south. For too long Helmand, Kandahar 
and other southern provinces have been allowed to symbolise the resurgent 
Taliban. We need to take these territories away from them.  
The only way any of this will ultimately succeed is if we rid ourselves 
of the tribal and ethnocentric loyalties that compromise every institution 
and enterprise in this country. We will never have a functional country as 
long as we cling to our tribal and ethnic roots at the sacrifice of competence 
and transparency in our institutions.  
Then we need our international friends to move Pakistan off the field 
here in Afghanistan, given that only those who provide them the funds that 
make what goes on here in Afghanistan so interesting to Pakistan can do 
so. Pakistan has to be made to see that there is a new game being played 
here, and that the ways of war are no longer relevant and must be replaced 
with multi-directional diplomacy and economic ties with all the region’s 
nations – to the benefit of all. The US and Afghanistan must not be forced 
to choose between India and Pakistan when it comes to Afghanistan. We 
are not the booty for another nation. Pakistan has enough within its own 
borders with which to define its national security interests. Pakistan can 
play a larger role than India in Afghanistan to be sure, but the role has to be 
productive in terms of changing into a donor and not a destructive actor. 
That is the way to even beat India.  
Then we have to strengthen our institutions. We need a strong 
security force to stabilise the nation, not to attack our neighbours. We need 
power distributed fairly, not to family members or favourites or a 
particular ethnicity. We need to put aside our tribal loyalties and find the 
best man – or woman – for each and every job in our country. We have too 
much work to leave it to the spoiled or the incompetent.  
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Instead of trying to buy the insurgents’ loyalty, why not shame them? 
The Pashtuns have a term that is translated as disgrace or shame (Nang). If 
a Pashtun is given something for free – a donation for example – he is not 
supposed to accept it. It seen as shameful to take alms when you have the 
ability to work. But if a Pashtun is given a short-term loan that is another 
story. So let us stop the alms-giving that is humiliating for many Afghans 
and instead start giving them access to financing so they can set up 
businesses and help the rest of us reclaim our nation. We Afghans, all of us, 
Pashtun and non-Pashtun alike, are a proud people. We do not want 
handouts. We want to work and be seen as equals. A programme to help us 
finance our enterprises would be welcome in every community. 
Then we must do something about the radical mullahs and molawis 
who exert such control over our people, especially among the ignorant. 
There was a fairly successful programme in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Area during 1930–34 under Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, called the 
Muslim Pashtun Movement of the North-West Frontier of India, which 
might be emulated.  
We need the mullahs to help convince our citizens that the true jihad 
in defence of Islam today is to refuse to give their hard-earned money to 
the Taliban, which demands protection money from them, and to refuse to 
give the insurgents refuge – in other words, a civilian jihad and non-violent 
struggle against the insurgents. If it happens, we will also be witness to a 
tribal awakening in Afghanistan, a story that will change the future of the 
country.  
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